

JACKSON

Journal

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Victory
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TRADITION ★ TRAINING ★ TRANSFORMATION





Jackson Journal

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Transforming civilians into Soldiers and motivating them to be mentally and physically strong is one of the main goals during Basic Combat Training (BCT).

The Jackson Journal is a professional journal that provides a forum for original thought and discussion on all aspects of training and leadership as they pertain to Initial Military Training. The views expressed in the Jackson Journal are those of the Authors, not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. The content does not necessarily reflect U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of the articles they provide. The Jackson Journal reserves the right to edit material.

The Jackson Journal is available online at:

<http://www.jackson.army.mil/sites/jacksonjournal/pages/745>

From the Commanding General

Welcome to the Jackson Journal, our professional journal focused on leading and training Soldiers in an Initial Military Training (IMT) operating environment. My number one priority as Commanding General is *TRAINING* and this journal is a great forum to improve Fort Jackson's organizational learning through the sharing of ideas, best practices, and lessons learned among all leaders.

“We Make American Soldiers!” is our vision at Fort Jackson. From before dawn to well after dusk this vision should drive your actions to make the best Soldier that you can, a Soldier prepared to win the first battle of the next war. All leaders must focus their efforts on training to standard, vice standardized training, and building a cohesive team within their organizations. For almost 100 years, Fort Jackson has set an example of standards and discipline for the Army, and produced the greatest Soldiers in the world; we must continue to build on this historic legacy.



Our feature article by SSG Chad Sage, a Drill Sergeant in 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment titled *“Zeroing the Unzeroable”* is a superb article that highlights the myriad of methods that a Drill Sergeant can use to train and teach a Soldier the fundamentals of Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM).

SFC Murphy Clayton and CPT Jeremy Jacobson have both written tremendous articles focused on the experiences and responsibilities of a Drill Sergeant. And Stephanie Sapp from our Basic Combat Training Museum has written a superb article on the U.S. Army's training in World War I and the unique role that Fort Jackson had during this timeframe.

Last, but not least, I thank every Soldier, Noncommissioned Officer and Officer in our formation for your admirable professionalism and untiring commitment, day-in and day-out, leading and training the future Soldiers of our great Army. As the Army's largest training center, we at Fort Jackson have been entrusted with a critical responsibility: to train, develop and care for America's most precious resource--its sons and daughters. No one does this mission better than you, and I am proud to be a part of this great team.

Victory Starts Here!

Bradley A. Becker
BG, USA
Commanding

Post Command Sergeant Major

As I prepare to relinquish responsibility of the United States Army Training Center and Fort Jackson I want to pass on a bit of what I have learned about training. Training is a very broad word and way to look at our professional development. I like to think training is coaching, teaching, counseling, and mentorship resulting in the development of the current and future personnel who will fight and defend our great nation and ensure our freedoms remain.

As an Infantry enlisted leader at every level from a Team Leader to an installation CSM with stops as both a Drill Sergeant and a Ranger Instructor I feel I have touched a lot of Officer's and enlisted personnel in every branch of our services. As I developed over my career I feel the most important basis of teaching someone is to first understand the human dimension piece of who you are attempting to communicate with. Knowing people and understanding their strengths and weaknesses, how they best learn, where they are from and how they grew up and what their goals are, is the basis to begin the relationship for development. Let's face it; getting our volunteer civilians to become Warriors and defeat our enemies is no easy feat and not a natural transition for our youth to pass through.




As instructors we transition in growth equal to individual age maturity levels. When we first begin we are not all that confident and therefore seem to be overly loud and boisterous. I always reflect on how children react to constant screamers; they just nod and agree and are quite so the crazy banshee in there faces will just shut up and go away. Effective teachers are communicators first. Yes, at times it is important to raise your voice to get the proper attention, then bring it down, look people in the eyes, treat them with respect and teach.

Being an effective coach, teacher, and mentor is an Art. Having relevance in what you are instructing means that you must have a complete understanding of the material and that you can relate practical experience in order to tie in the lesson or period of instruction. This is called being a professional. It is very hard to instruct anyone on anything if you can't first execute, then second lead. We must all remember that leadership means to motivate individuals to do what is required to accomplish our mission(s) and that starts with a simple comment "Follow me". Do not allow the inability of your trainee or student to learn or adhere to rules and regulations become personal. Train, test, retrain, retest, and then go from there. Not everyone can serve in our military and that is fine.

As time has come close for me to bid our Military goodbye, I find the most important legacy I have left behind are those that will be the future of our Military. As you continue to serve, train our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen like they will deploy and fight beside you on your next combat deployment and your focus will be spot on! Know that you have provided those junior to you the tools required to be Professional Service Members for life and survive on today's modern battlefields.

Victory Starts Here!

Kevin R. Benson
CSM, USA
PCSM



Zeroing the Unzeroable

SSG Chad A. Sage

Basic Combat Training (BCT) consists of numerous Warrior tasks and drill requirements that Soldiers must pass prior to graduating. The most important skill that a Soldier leaves BCT with is the ability to qualify and use their weapon in any given situation. This skill provides them the ability to fire and maneuver with their weapon in combat, if needed. Soldiers that leave Initial Entry Training (IET) must be able to fight; therefore, they must qualify as a rifleman before they go into combat. Drill Sergeants understand the importance of this skill, but do they really have the skills to get their Soldiers there? A Drill Sergeant who has been through the periods of Basic Rifle Marksmanship knows how frustrating it can be with Soldiers that just cannot comprehend the basic fundamentals and concepts of BRM. For years, Soldiers that could not grasp the BRM fundamentals and concepts have been given the label of hardcore.

The hardcore is the private that just does not understand marksmanship, the one who has all but shut down and is almost beyond hope. That one Soldier that most Drill Sergeants want no part of for fear of losing their sanity. However, cycle after cycle hardcore shooters qualify. Normally they qualify after firing repeatedly, and after firing a basic combat load at zero targets.

The one question that needs to be asked in regards to these Soldiers is if these Soldiers had zeroed their rifle correctly during periods four (group/zero) and five (confirm zero), would they still be a hardcore shooter on qualification day? The answer might be surprising for some, absolutely NOT!

The firers who do not understand how to apply the fundamentals of marksmanship during periods four and five miss out on almost all of the training value of basic rifle marksmanship periods six (singles), eight (multiples) and nine (pre-qualification). What is worse is that period 7 (EST 2) only compounds confusion if they see some success. It gives some hope to a Soldier, just to have it crushed the next day when they go back to their shoddy zero and shoot terribly.

While the majority of trainees at least have a decent zero, begin to grasp the correlation between point of aim and point of impact, and work to improve fluidity of the firing process to improve speed, the hardcore is still scratching their head in regards to the fundamentals. They are frustrated, dejected, and are primarily thinking about the likelihood of not graduating.

What is a hardcore shooter? My definition of a hardcore is a Soldier who has significant deficiencies in more than one of the four

fundamentals of rifle marksmanship. The majority of the time, this Soldier will not be successful without individual attention and training from a knowledgeable trainer. Many Drill Sergeants begin to “call” who their hardcores will be on the very first day of grouping/zeroing. They may be right. That Soldier may be a nuisance throughout the periods of BRM. Conversely, that Soldier may only be problematic for a day or two of training if they are caught early, assigned to a Drill Sergeant with the skill and patience to fix their issues, and given the time and training required for the select few, known as “hardcores.”

How do we handle the Soldier that cannot grasp the fundamentals of marksmanship? A three-pronged attack is in order. One, the firer must be assessed for deficiencies. This includes issues during the firing process, issues with the rifle, and issues with the firer. The next step in this attack is where the shot group analysis begins. This step takes a healthy dose of walking back and forth to retrieve disappointing results and trying to coax the firer into corrections. Third, the trainer must have the tools for the job. This includes some standard training aids and some unorthodox techniques picked up along the way.

Assessing the firer

A common miscue in shot group analysis stems from the fact that the firer goes group after group after group without being observed by the zeroer. The shot group analysis begins with the instructor/trainer observing the Soldier while he fires, looking for proper position, aim, trigger squeeze, and breathing. It goes on to specifically say: Coaches should not use shot group analysis without observing the firer. (FM 3-22.9) Let's be realistic, a Drill Sergeant cannot observe all 4-8 Soldiers that they are responsible for at any given time. That should not keep us from taking educated guesses in shot group analysis. However, when it comes to the Soldier who is repeatedly having gross issues, observation of the firer and the firing

process is paramount. Observation can and should happen from multiple vantage points. It should include observation of all fundamentals, but extra attention is required in the suspected problem areas. Keying in on just the fundamental that is suspected could easily result in other problem areas being overlooked.

First thing first, the firer should be observed for a suitable position. “If support is used properly, the Soldier should be able to relax most of his muscles... Using muscles to support the rifle can cause muscle fatigue, which in turn, causes the weapon to move.” (FM 3-22.9) The field manual gives an overview of the places to key in. Referencing the checklist and overview of position in, “Rifle Marksmanship Diagnostic and Training Guide” is another source of information.



I will cover the most common and problematic areas I have encountered in the last two years. I typically start at the feet and move towards the rifle. I do this because very few issues are found in the lower extremities and the majority of the issues happen close to the rifle and there are usually multiple deficiencies in this region. Natural point of aim (NPA) is a regular flaw in hardcores shooters. They wiggle and wobble into their position and by the time they are set, they do not even look comfortable. Natural point of aim is defined by the United States Army Marksmanship Unit as: the point at which the rifle sights settle when in a firing position. One tool for checking NPA is to have the firer get into position and then


close their eyes. When they open them, if they are considerably off target, they need to adjust their position to be closer to on target naturally. Another way to identify a bad NPA is while watching the Soldier fire, if the recoil of the rifle pulls the weapon off of the target considerably; the NPA needs to be reacquired. See “Rifle Marksmanship Diagnostic and Training Guide” for a breakdown of how to adjust a firer’s NPA higher, lower, left, or right.

Another problem area commonly observed is the placement of the non-firing hand. This hand can be incorrectly placed in a myriad of ways. The most problematic positioning of this hand is in between the hand-guards and the sand bag if the hand-guards are not resting on the sand bag. This defeats most of the benefit of having the support in the first place. On a positive note, this is one of the easiest issues to fix. Simply have the Soldier slide their entire body and rifle backwards a couple of inches and then check the height of their sand bags to ensure proper support. Another way to go about fixing this is to beat a position into the sand bag for their hand to lie in. This is preferable as it allows the Soldier to stay in close to the support and allows the Soldier the ability to “pin” the rifle between their body and the sand bags. An additional poor placement of the non-firing hand is on the magazine well. Although this does not have a tremendous impact on firing in the prone supported position, this poor practice will lead to further headaches in the prone unsupported position. Remember, we are coaching/fixing a hard-core here, so we need to fix as many problems as possible as rapidly as possible so as to get to “perfect practice.”

The elbows are a third point of high concern with our new firers. Although they have a lot more room to play with (in regards to be able to fire accurately) in the prone supported firing position, we should enforce good habits while grouping/zeroing so that we do not have to spend more time with this hard-core firer when it is time to transition to the prone unsupported. As well, our prone supported position should mirror our unsupported position with the exception of the manner in which the front of the rifle is

supported. The firing side elbow should be placed on the ground and generally in line with the shoulder. There is some room to move in further in or out, but it should be in close enough to promote grasping the pistol grip comfortably and high on the grip. The non-firing side elbow is generally of more concern. Often time our poorer shooters do not have this elbow on the ground. Or they have it far outside their shoulder which leads to having a position that is far too low and will cripple them during unsupported firing. A quick fix for this issue of positioning the elbows in the prone supported position is to put the Soldier into a good prone unsupported position first. Then build up the support next to the firer’s rifle. This will ensure that the rifle is supported at the correct height and help “force” the shooter into proper placement of the elbows.

A final area to spend considerable time critiquing is the position of the head, or cheek-to-stock weld. You need to ensure that the rifle has been brought up to the head instead of the opposite and checking that the head does not move forward or backward in between shot groups. You also need to confirm that the head is not moved around unnecessarily in between shots. All of these are mistakes that can cause significant error for a new shooter. Each is easy to spot, as long as we are watching our shooters instead of just analyzing shot groups. To begin to work this portion, I always ensure that the rifle butt is in the shoulder pocket correctly. If a Soldier cannot seem to find that “sweet spot,” here is a quick check. Have the Soldier get into the prone supported position. Then, without moving the non-firing hand, have the firer reach their firing arm all the way forward so that it is parallel to the hand-guards. Next the Soldier slowly draws their firing arm towards their body, tracing their hand along the hand guards until it comes to rest on the pistol grip. As long as the elbow was placed on the ground correctly, the firer should now have the rifle in the pocket, the firing hand



in a good high grip on the hand-guards, and have the firing side aligned correctly.

The one area that my Drill Sergeant was constantly focused on while I was in basic training was the charging handle. “The Soldier should begin by trying to touch the charging handle with his nose when assuming a firing position. The Soldier should be mindful of how the nose touches the charging handle and should be consistent when doing so.” (FM 3-22.9) What if my hardcore is 5’2” and has no chance of getting their nose to the charging handle? This is where experience and varied techniques come into play. One such technique is to draw a white line with a Sharpie on the butt

stock so that the firer can just barely see it out of the bottom of their eye. Another technique is to use a piece of moleskin or a Band-Aid to give the Soldier something to “feel” for with their face. A third would be to have the warrior put up a set number of fingers (extended and joined) in between the charging handle and their nose to judge the gap consistently.

When assessing the firer, position is not the only thing we should be checking and correcting. Breath control is also very apparent while observing a Soldier fire their weapon. I believe that we all know that the ideal breathing rhythm for a firer is to hold the breath at the natural respiratory pause after exhalation. However, here is a fact that I do not think we (Drill Sergeants) know as a whole. A rifle can be zeroed perfectly well while breathing in, pausing, and then firing, or breathing halfway out, pausing and firing. Yes, it is not ideal, but here is my point - when a trainer is observing the breathing of a Soldier, it is more important that the Soldier pause during the firing process than it is that the breath is held is at the natural respiratory pause. The absolute killer in

the fundamental of breath control is when a Soldier never holds their breath during the process. If the Soldier continues to breathe while going through the firing motion, the sights, and more importantly, the rifle will continue to move through the firing process. Let us take a look at just how much this may cost the Soldier. “Any alignment error between the front and rear sights repeats itself for every ½ meter the bullet travels. For example, at the 25 meter line, any error in rifle alignment is multiplied 50 times (FM 3-22.9).” So, if the Soldier continues to breathe and the rifle moves just 1/10 of an inch between when the firer is aligned and the time the firer actually pulls the trigger, it causes a miss of 5 inches from the intended point of impact. The end state is that the firer must hold their breath during the firing process. Preferably this happens at the same point in the process, and even better would be at the natural respiratory pause in the breathing cycle. Simply watch the rise and fall of the warrior’s back and make necessary corrections until the firer understands their deficiencies.

The last place to focus your attention on when assessing a firer is in the trigger squeeze. Thinking about the aforementioned example of just how much impact a slight jerk can cause, it should be elementary that the rifle cannot move during the firing process. A lot of the movement that happens to a hard-core firer tends to be in jerking the trigger. The manipulation of the trigger can be summed up in one word, smooth. It should be a smooth, uniform, gradual increase in pressure on the trigger until the hammer falls. Follow through is equally important. Thinking in super slow motion, there is some period of time in between when the hammer falls and the time that the projectile exits the barrel. A shooter must ensure that the rifle is not moved due to erratic trigger squeeze or lack of follow through to have a successful shot. Most hard-core firers can be talked through this process. Some, however, just do not catch on. There are two similar ways to further the understanding of the Soldier. First, with the

Soldier still applying all of the fundamentals, place your finger on top of the firer's finger. By applying smooth pressure to their finger, which in turn applies the pressure to the trigger, a firer can feel what right feels like. Then the Soldier can repeat the process in the opposite manner so that the trainer can confirm that he/she understands. The coach puts his/her finger on the trigger and the firer adds pressure to the trainer's finger to demonstrate that they fully understand.

Shot Group Analysis

In my opinion, poor shot group analysis is the single greatest contributor to repeated poor performance, other than the firers themselves. So where is the problem? I believe that too often, we as trainers take a five second look at a shot group and give advice that is incorrect for the situation. For example, when a shot group is checked and five shots with little left/right deviation, but great north/south deviation often a firer is told something along the lines of, "Watch your breathing."

First off, what does that even mean? Does it mean hold my breath longer, not so long, hold my breath in general, hold it at the top of my breath, bottom of my breath, etc.? Second, is that the actual cause of the problem? There are a number of shot group patterns that are commonly seen. There are often multiple reasons for each of these patterns. Only through watching the firer and experience can a trainer hope to tackle these shot groups without having to go through 30, 60, 90 rounds with a Soldier. In both FM 3-22.9 and "Rifle Marksmanship Diagnostic and Training Guide" there are a number of different shot group patterns that are depicted with possible causes of these groupings, but I would like to take a closer look at a few of them.

The first I would like to discuss is the five round group with little left/right deviation, but north/south deviation between each shot. As I stated earlier, this is often attributed to poor breath control. Although that is a slight possibility, it is not listed as a probable cause in any reference I have found. FM 3-22.9 lists this as a mistake in one's sight

picture. To further this, the assumption is that the firer does not consistently stop his/her vertical target acquisition at the same point each time. If it is a long vertical shot group it is a strong possibility that the firer is misaligning his/her sights according to "Rifle Marksmanship Diagnostic and Training Guide." In other words, the firer is most likely not centering the front sight post in the rear sight aperture.

A second group I will take a look at is a scattered shot group. This shot group is where each shot has several (4 to about 15) centimeters in between shots. References list four separate causes. The first is anticipating the shot, or "flinching." The Soldier is cognizant of when they are going to cause the hammer to fall and react to this before they complete the firing motion. Next is the firer may be focusing on the target instead of the front sight post. This will cause slight error in the alignment of the front sight post, which as we discussed earlier, can have detrimental effects at range.



The third is changing head position in between shots. Each time the firer changes the position of the head in between shots, a slightly different alignment of the eye, rear sight aperture, and front site post occurs. The final possible cause listed is an unstable position, which can cause excess wobble and trying to "time the shot." As I have stated a couple of times, with experience a good trainer will learn other causes to a shot group such as this one. Maybe the firer is covering the entire silhouette with the front sight post. Maybe the Soldier needs glasses and just cannot see the target or the front sight post well. Another may be that the shooter is not closing their non-firing eye.

The final shot group to be explored is a good shot group (4 cm or less) that continues to move around the paper contrary to adjustments or with adjustments at all. This is generally attributed to the hardcore “chasing their shot groups.” In other words, the firer is attempting to compensate for shots outside of the four-centimeter circle by using “Kentucky windage”. This very well may be true; however the book has other possible causes. What if the shot group drops low left or low right from one shot group to the next without adjustment? This may be attributed to chasing shots, however in actuality it more likely that the rifle was canted significantly during that particular shot group. Maybe the firer had a position with a good natural point of aim during the first group, and then after checking the target, the firer got into a position with a much less desirable NPA. When assessing a shot group there can be many factors that lead to a shot group. Only through trial and error (least preferred method) or actually watching the firer shoot (most preferred) can a shot group be analyzed and corrected. This is a frustrating process for both the hardcore and the Drill Sergeant. It only makes sense that we take the time to watch the firer with poor groups to help them (the firer) help us (by getting zeroed)!

Tools, Training Aids, and Unorthodox Methods

So, I know how to check, coach, and coax a Soldier on the fundamentals. I am a professional at analyzing shot groups to correct deficiencies. What the heck do I do for those few that still just cannot shoot well despite my tireless assistance? Here a few tools, tips, and tricks I have picked up over the last two years. The first really does not fit any of the aforementioned categories, but is imperative nonetheless. Training, Preliminary Marksmanship Instruction (PMI), concurrent training, and remedial training are moneymakers. Often a less than stellar instructor is sent to these sites while a unit conducts training. This is a serious mistake. A safety on the line does help out a

number of Soldiers with his/her experience and expertise throughout a day at the range. He/she gets to coach, teach, and mentor up to 40 Soldiers in a day.



Conversely, the concurrent and/or remedial training Drill Sergeant may aid the entire Company in a day. This must be an instructor with the knowledge, skill set, and ability to enhance understanding and ability to perform the fundamentals of Basic Rifle Marksmanship. This Drill Sergeant is the person those instructors on the line are counting on to send a Soldier with grievous deficiencies to, and then have them return with a much better understanding of the four fundamentals. These subject matter experts save time, ammunition, and much undue frustration.

A technique I regularly use with hardcore firers is to zero their rifle to myself. “A properly zeroed weapon for one Soldier is close to the zero for another Soldier... Most firers can fire with the same zeroed weapon if they properly apply marksmanship fundamentals.” Sometimes I do this in front of them and sometimes I send them to “take a water break” and keep their weapon. If I allow them to watch it is to dispel the thought that the problem may be with the weapon. If I do not let them watch it is generally because they Soldier is dejected, needs a break, and if I zero the rifle and then the firer sees even one or two rounds in the black, it helps break the losing trend.

Next is a tool mentioned in the field manual and available at TASC; however I have not seen their presence as much as I believe to be necessary. The M15A1 aiming card is the green card that depicts proper sight alignment and is used to show proper sight picture. At most group/zero ranges you will see Drill Sergeants drawing in the sand, scribbling on paper, and depicting what they want the firer to see in a number of other fashions. I have done the same and there is nothing wrong with these techniques. However, the M15A1 aiming card accomplishes most of what we are trying to get through to our Soldiers. It has the versatility to allow us to show a Soldier, or for a Soldier to demonstrate what they are doing. It is often a very quick remedy to a massive problem like covering the whole target with the front sight post or setting the whole target on top of the tip of the front sight post.

The next tool is the M16 sighting device. I had never seen one before being shown it by another Drill Sergeant. Just about every cycle there is a Drill Sergeant who asks me what it is and how I am using it, and then is blown away by how useful it is. It is a piece of mirrored glass that clips on the weapon right above the charging handle. The glass is at a 45-degree angle so that the firer can look right through it, but the coach can see through the sights as well. There is some degree of familiarity and skill that it takes to use. This is because if the firer has misaligned the sights significantly, and the coach aligns them correctly, you and the firer see two different things. For example, if the firer says that their sights are aligned and aimed center mass but they actually have the front sight post all the way to the left or right in the rear sight aperture, the coach will see the sights aligned but aiming grossly off target. Therefore, the coach has to have some practice with this device before troubleshooting Soldiers who have no idea what they are doing wrong. However, this device can quickly give a coach insight into many different fundamental errors. Some of them include; the firer still breathing while taking the shot, the firer trying to “time” a shot in a large wobble area instead of settling the rifle before firing, misaligning the sights,

aiming at the numbered sign on their lane instead of the target on their number lane (true story), etc.

One technique used to check on the Soldier who continues to move their head either in between shots or in between groups is to just draw two dots. Have the firer get in their firing position. Then make a small dot on the butt stock of the weapon and a small dot on the Soldiers check so that the two dots are touching. Then you are free to check on other Soldiers and all you have to do is glance and see if the dots are touching to see if the firer in question has moved his/her head again. It is probably not a technique to be used with every Soldier, but if that is the problem with a firer, it gives you the freedom to coach a different Soldier and still have a way to monitor the original warrior's deficiency.

These are just a few of the things to be considered, techniques I have learned, and places to reference more information. There are many more places that can cause issues such as cross hand and eye dominance, needing glasses, and being able to tell if it is in fact the weapon that is causing the problem. But with the information mentioned above, we have a real good start at getting more Soldiers zeroed per day, and consequently freeing up more time to spend helping other privates.

In conclusion, I am convinced that 99.9% of Soldiers can be zeroed with the right coach. The “right coach” is not a certain person. It is someone who understands assessing the firer, assessing shot groups, and has the tools to make changes. It is someone with the time, skill, and patience to remedy a multitude of issues in a short amount of time and rounds.

SSG Chad Sage is a Drill Sergeant in Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade

TRADITION

Fort Jackson has had a vital role in preparing Americans to serve their country for over 96 years. When the installation was built in 1917, just like today, our nation was at war. Since then, numerous units have prepared for battle here—the 4th Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 81st Infantry Division. More than 500,000 Soldiers trained here before fighting in World War II. The Soldiers who trained here before us leave us with a proud legacy and have inspired many to follow in their footsteps. Although the Army has changed tremendously over the years, we are all part of that lineage of brave Americans. All of us should be proud to be part of the tradition that defines this great installation.



TRAINING

Training is our hallmark. With two Brigades, nine Battalions and 52 Companies focused solely on training Soldiers in Basic Combat Training (BCT), Fort Jackson, is the largest Initial Military Training Center in the U.S. Army. Roughly half of all Soldiers who complete Basic Combat Training in the United States Army do so at Fort Jackson, SC. We are also home to Advanced Individual Training units, the Soldier Support Institute, the Drill Sergeant School, Armed Forces Chaplain Center and School, Victory College, and the National Center for Credibility Assessment.




TRANSFORMATION

Although we have a proud tradition on which to rely and inspire us, we must never lose sight of the future. To be effective, we must be willing and ready to accept change. Transformation means more than just modernizing our infrastructure. This means constantly challenging ourselves, our methods, and our means. Transformation is not a new concept here. Our responsibility as leaders hinges on our ability to continually evaluate and improve training. It is only by providing the best training that effective transformation from civilian into Soldier can occur.



THE EXPERIENCE OF A NEW DRILL SERGEANT!



SFC MURPHY CLAYTON

I have been in the United States Army for twelve years. I have endured 57 months of combat time. Yet, nothing has been more challenging than being a Drill Sergeant. When I arrived to my Drill assignment at Fort Jackson, I joined Delta Company, 3-60th Infantry during the transition from white phase to blue phase. What I learned is those few short weeks was extremely valuable and will stick with me throughout my assignment and career. With that being said, I didn't get the pride I felt during "my" first cycle.

When I took this assignment I figured, like most people, I would do my time and leave. I knew it was going to be long grueling days, that were mentally and physically demanding. I figured I would show up to work, do the job to the best of my ability, and go home. I knew there was no way I would make a connection with young people I would train. I didn't have time for that. That is not what I was here for.

As it happens, on the first day of receiving new warriors, there is a lot of energy and controlled chaos. When they get off the bus all you see are bodies. "There are so many of them," I thought to myself. There isn't a lot of time in the day to stop and process the fact that over the next few weeks, you are their sole provider. A Drill Sergeant and training will be this warrior's entire universe for the next nine weeks.

As the days pass in the first phase you're trying to learn names and faces. Over the next week or so, you begin to notice personality traits and quirks in their behavior. As time continues, you begin to anticipate the individual warrior's needs and where they may need extra assistance, based on what you have noticed. I began to find myself seeing them as individuals and not just as my platoon.

After exhausting days at the range. We were at the company getting ready for accountability formation, when a warrior came up to me and asked if he could talk to me. He said he had a hard time at the range. It was his first time shooting a weapon and he didn't understand the proper firing techniques. He expressed his appreciation and gratitude for the tips I gave him to help him qualify. I told him no thanks was needed.

Over the next weeks I watched the platoon change. They made it to the point where they could march themselves to chow. I don't know if they were sensing graduation was within reach, but they seemed to be walking just a little bit taller. Their heads seemed to be a little bit higher and their step had a little extra something to it. As I watched them an overwhelming feeling of pride came over me. I hadn't stopped to think about it until this point, but I trained these soldiers. I had a hand in molding today's Army. These young people will go into the world to serve and protect our country and

I was there at the beginning. There is no greater joy as a teacher than to watch the student take with them what they have learned and apply it, practice it, live it.

Although I had a breakthrough moment, I would be remiss if I didn't offer a few tips to incoming Drill Sergeants. The following is based on my experiences so far. Too often than not, we get caught up in being perfect. We don't want anyone to know what we don't know. I for one learned quickly that I don't know it all. You don't have to be the go to person right off the bat. It is best to watch how things are done and ask questions to the seasoned Drill Sergeants. Whether they are one cycle in or about to finish, they all have more experience than you.

Also privates will hang onto your every word. They are like sponges when it comes to what you say. Because of this you have to be clear and concise. There cannot be room for error when giving instruction. Always keep the end goal in mind. Ask yourself "what do I want them to do and how do I want them to do it?" If you are vague or indecisive it could lead to injury.

I can't tell you how many stories I've heard and how many people I've known so far that push the boundaries. Today's Army is not the same as when I came in. Things have changed; the days of being afraid of your Drill Sergeant are over. Now we are in a time where a Drill Sergeant takes on more of a role as a mentor/facilitator. The Drill Sergeant is the Warriors' guide in the learning process while teaching Army Core Values and instilling pride. Time after time we are taught regulation after regulation after regulation. Learn them, live them, and love them. It is easy to get caught up in the gung-ho attitude. There is a difference in power and authority, know it!

If you are a support MOS, be patient. In time you will get it. Understand there is not much time at the school house to go over all of the finer points of IET. Understand that there will be a sizable learning curve since you don't do that type of work day in and day out. If you have to pause for

a moment and think if what you're doing is right, then it's probably not. I can't say enough about having a support system with your peers. I think I was one of the lucky ones. I was able to walk into a company that was willing to help. So take the help.



In my short time with Delta Company, I have learned warriors entering today's Army need strong and intelligent leaders to pass on their knowledge. It is my job to mold the minds of the new warriors to take pride; in themselves, their job, and this country. I look forward to my remaining time on the trail, and the opportunity and privilege to have a role in the start of so many new careers with the United States Army.

SFC Murphy Clayton is a Drill Sergeant in Delta Company, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade

Striving for Perfection: U.S. Army Training in World War I

Stephanie Sapp

EXERCISE. CAMP JACKSON. COLUMBIA. S.C.

"To render the most perfect service on the field of battle is the final object for which our Army is created and maintained."

War Department Document No. 656: Infantry Training, August 1917

When the United States entered World War I, Europe had already been at war for nearly three years. The Allied Powers, composed of the United Kingdom, France, and the Russian Empire, were struggling against the Central Powers, composed of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Central Powers were divided in a two-front war, splitting its troops between front lines in Russia and in France. The Western Front stretched from the English Channel to Switzerland in a line through France, halfway between the Belgium-France border and Paris. For more than two years, the front line of the war had moved less than ten miles in either direction, and both sides were entrenched in a war of attrition. When the American troops arrived in Europe in June 1917, they were met with a stalemated war with both sides struggling to adapt warfare tactics to new technology, specifically the machine gun, tanks, and poisonous gases.¹ When Congress passed President Wilson's declaration of war on April 6, 1917, the Army had just over 200,000 Soldiers trained and ready to fight. From

April 1917 to November 1918, in a time span of nineteen months, the Army trained 3.5 million more Americans to fight in Europe.² To accomplish this incredible task, the Army built sixteen National Army Cantonments and sixteen National Guard mobilization camps, and the Army War College developed a standardized training program.³ The training program developed during World War I was revolutionary for the Army, and it established a tradition of training that continues today; however, the initial training program was not perfect, and the War Department faced many obstacles in delivering competent, trained Soldiers to the front lines of Europe.

In April 1917, the U.S. Army was not ready for a global war, but the Allied Powers were desperate for manpower after three years of fighting, and they pressured the United States to send men as quickly as possible. The first American troops arrived in Europe in June 1917 where they completed a five-month training program under the tutelage of British and French officers.⁴ For the

1 Stewart, Richard W., ed. "Prologue: The War in Europe, 1914-1917." *The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003*. American Military History, vol. 2. Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005.

2 Rainey, James W. "The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I." *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College* 22 (Winter 1992-93): 89-90

3 Fortescue, Major Granville. "Training the New Armies of Liberty: Camp Lee, Virginia's Home for the National Army," *National Geographic* 32 (November - December 1917): 421-438; Showalter, William Joseph. "America's New Soldier Cities: The Geographical and Historical Environment of the National Army Cantonments and National Guard Camps." *National Geographic* 32 (November-December 1917): 439-476; United States War Department. General Orders No. 95, July 18, 1917. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917.

4 Johnson, Douglas Valentine, II. "A few 'squads left' and off to France: Training the American Army in the United States for World War I." PhD. diss., Temple University, 1980: 103; Grotelueschen, Mark Ethan. "The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in the First World War." PhD. diss., Texas A&M University, 2003: 18.

first two months, this program stressed physical conditioning, close order drill, and marches with full packs. Soldiers learned basic combat skills such as bayonet training, rifle target practice, and familiarization with grenades and automatic weapons. In the third month of training, Soldiers studied small-unit maneuvers and basic tactical doctrine. In the fourth month of training, Soldiers were immersed in trench-warfare training exercises, and they continued their training with their rifles, with automatic and anti-tank weapons, and with anti-gas measures. Late in the fourth month of training, Soldiers were moved to the front line trenches for a true immersion training experience, and the Soldiers refined their survival skills in the trenches. In the final stage of training, during the fifth month, Soldiers were transferred



back from the front lines to their original training areas, and for three weeks they practiced their trench warfare maneuvers and began training for open warfare, outside of the trenches.⁵ As time progressed, troops began to receive rudimentary training in the United States before their arrival in Europe, and the training in France was reduced to a three-month program. In the United States, Soldiers completed two months of training focused on physical conditioning and target practice, and in France, the training was restructured to address only survival skills and tactical maneuvers. In France, the first month of training addressed small-unit maneuvers, the second month of training was

in the front line trenches with French units, and the third month of training, completed back at the training area, focused on large-unit exercises and open warfare maneuvers.⁶

Meanwhile, as the first American Soldiers were arriving in France and completing their training there, the Army was preparing itself to train an unprecedented number of Soldiers as quickly as possible in the United States. Construction of sixteen new National Army cantonments and sixteen new National Guard mobilization camps began in the summer of 1917. At Camp Jackson, initially known as the 6th National Army Cantonment, construction began on June 11, 1917 under the supervision of Hardaway Contracting Company. The standardized construction of all of the Army cantonments featured a highly centralized layout. Each base had a central main street, approximately 100 feet wide and 2.5 miles long. Battalion and regimental streets ran perpendicular off of the main street. On one side of the main stretch, buildings were constructed for officer's quarters, administration buildings, hospitals, general stores, storage warehouses, and civilian support organizations. On the other side of the main road, barracks housed one company of Soldiers each, and four barracks were grouped together to house a battalion.⁷ At Camp Jackson, with a work force of 9,592 men, construction progressed quickly. In six months, 1,519 buildings were constructed including theaters, stores, kitchens, barracks, officers' quarters, training facilities, stables, warehouses, garages, an airfield, a water reservoir, sewers, heating plants, a hospital, laundry facilities, and housing for 44,009 men and 12,274 animals.⁸

With the construction of training cantonments underway throughout America, the U.S. Army began to advance on the development of a standardized training program. A rudimentary training outline, General Order No. 44, had been issued in 1906 which established the basic instruction required for each Soldier. That training outline divided training into two phases,

⁵ Grotelueschen, 51-53.

⁶ Grotelueschen, 163.

⁷ Fortescue, 425-427.

⁸ 50th Anniversary History, 1917-1967: Fort Jackson, South Carolina. United States Army Training Center, Infantry, Columbia, South Carolina, November 11, 1967.

garrison training and field training. Garrison instruction included training in physical fitness, bayonet and combative exercises, tent-pitching, close-order drills, ceremonial drill, guard duty, horse and riding exercises, hygienic care, and swimming. Field training included range firing, practice marches, camping, advance and rear guard formations, the attack and defense of convoys, out-post duty, reconnaissance, patrolling, night operations, road sketching, making reports, the use of entrenching tools, and individual field cooking. Soldiers completed their training at recruiting depots, the first reporting station for a Soldier after enlistment, where new recruits completed a physical examination and six months of basic training to determine their fitness for service.⁹ At the recruiting depots, sergeants and corporals under the supervision of an officer served as the training instructors, but the training schedule and manner of teaching was left up to the discretion of the department commander.¹⁰



In August 1917, *War Department Document No. 656: Infantry Training* (WDD 656) was added to the training library of the U.S. Army. General Order No.44 of 1906, the predecessor of WDD 656, had established the subject-matter of basic training without any sort of timeline or explanation of instruction. In WDD 656, the Army, for the first time, defined the standards of and provided a set schedule for the basic training of every Soldier in the Army.¹¹ The document outlined a sixteen-week, 40-hours-per-week training program complete with a weekly training schedule. The War College referenced the 1911 *Infantry Drill Regulations*, the 1914 *Field Service Regulations*, the 1917 *Manual for*

Noncommissioned Officers and Privates, the 1913 *Small-Arms Firing Manual*, and the 1914 *Manual of Physical Training* for the particulars of infantry training instruction. *Infantry Drill Regulations* outlined the principles of saluting; of morning PT; of marching; of close order drill and extended order drill movements (including basic firing, attack, and defense instructions); of camping and tent pitching; of ceremonies and honors; of basic communications using bugle calls; the manual of arms; the manual of the saber and of the colors; and instructions for the band, the advance and rear guards, and the outposts.¹² *Small Arms Firing Manual* addressed rifle training including the fundamental principles of marksmanship, the principles for firing at fixed distances at clearly defined targets, and the principles of combat firing in terms of cooperation and coordination among the individuals in a firing unit.¹³ *Field Service Regulations* outlined operational and administrative tactics of U.S. Army units, with specific attention to the collection and transmission of information, the placement of security, the issuance of orders, the conduct of marches and convoys, and defensive and offensive combat tactics.¹⁴

In WDD 656, training was structured around the idea that the proficiency of the Army was determined by the proficiency of the individual brigades; the proficiency of the brigades was determined by the proficiency for the individual regiments; the proficiency of the regiments was determined by the proficiency of the individual battalions; and so on, down through the company, squad, and individual Soldier levels. Therefore, training progressed incorporating larger and larger groups of Soldiers. For the first two of weeks of training, Soldiers immersed themselves in the School of the Soldier, a block of instruction that focused on individual Soldier skills such as halt, rests, facings, steps, marchings, and care of the rifle.¹⁵ Concurrently with the School of the Soldier, Soldiers participated in a block of instruction called the School of the Squad. The School of the Squad was taught during the first six weeks of training, overlapping with the School of the Soldier for the first two weeks and with the next phase of training,

⁹ Johnson, 61-62.

¹⁰ United States War Department. General Orders No. 177, August 27, 1907. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907.

¹¹ Johnson, 124.

¹² United States War Department Document No. 394. *Infantry Drill Regulations*, United States Army, 1911. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911.

¹³ United States War Department Document No. 442. *Small Arms Firing Manual*, 1913. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917.

¹⁴ United States War Department Document No. 475. *Field Service Regulations*, 1914. New York: Army and Navy Journal, 1916.

¹⁵ *Infantry Drill Regulations*.

learning to maneuver within platoons, for the fifth and sixth weeks. During School of the Squad, Soldiers learned to work together in groups of three to eleven Soldiers, applying the drill movements learned during School of the Soldier and practicing attack movements in cooperation with other Soldiers. In week five, Soldiers were eased into platoon level instruction, and they learned to work in slightly larger groups of three to four squads or sixteen to forty Soldiers. At this level of instruction, squads became a fixed unit on the battlefield, and within platoons, the squads learned to move in coordination with one another. For the next three weeks, Soldiers became proficient with their movements within the squad and within the platoon, learning to maneuver as a small group until at week nine --more than halfway through training-- Soldiers were introduced to the School of the Company. In the School of the Company, Soldiers learned to work in groupings of 100-200 Soldiers, divided into two to four platoons of two to four squads each. Platoons learned to maneuver in relation to one another in parade and on the battlefield. At week fifteen, in the last two weeks of training, Soldiers were introduced to the School of the Battalion, and they learned the mechanisms of working in groups of two to six companies, or 500-1000 Soldiers. The concepts of maneuvering learned during the School of the Battalion were then easily translated to even larger groupings of Soldiers such as the regiments and brigades.¹⁶

Throughout the process of basic training, from the introductory weeks of individual Soldier training until the mass battalion-level training at the finale, the skills taught were designed to heighten the Army's fire superiority and trench warfare capabilities. Rifle exercises, including sighting and aiming drills and target practice, comprised 34%, or 220 hours, of basic training. Seven percent, or 44 hours, of training was dedicated to bayonet exercises, and four percent, or 27 hours, of training was dedicated to bombing and grenades instruction. Five percent, or 31 hours, of training was devoted to the concepts of trench warfare. The only other significant blocks of instruction covered physical training with 59 hours of training, and the School of the Squad during which Soldiers spent 55 hours developing teamwork skills. The remaining third of training focused on basic soldiering skills-- such as drill and ceremony, marching, night work, tent pitching, communications, first aid, and anti-gas maneuvers-- and administrative chores--such as the issuance of clothing and arms, lectures, inspections, and testing.¹⁷

On top of the hands-on instruction used throughout training, lectures were used to provide additional information on personal hygiene, public health, personal well-being, military life, and basic soldiering skills. Table 1 provides a list of the general subjects delivered in lecture form.¹⁸

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discipline - Morale - Customs and courtesies of the service - Duties and responsibilities of the NCO - The commissioned officer - Articles of war - Why we are at war - Military offences and punishments - Organization and characteristics of the US, Allied, and enemy troops - Personal hygiene - Alcoholism and drugs - Insects and vermin - Communicable diseases - First aid and elementary bandaging - Physical training - Care and adjustment of clothing and equipment - Security in the field - Purposes and methods of drill - Reconnaissance - Study of terrain on the ground - Messages and report - Orders - Entrenchments - Tactical use of machine guns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Grenade and bomb warfare - Transportation of troops- Conduct in service - Leadership - Saluting - Obligations and rights of the Soldier - Pay and allowances - Army regulations and orders - History of European wars and United States wars - Powers and limitations of various arms - Rules of land warfare - Venereal disease - Personal cleanliness - Vaccination and prophylaxis - Care of the feet - Sanitation and its maintenance - Property responsibility - Interior guard duty - Rations - Use of cover - Maps and map reading - Lines of information - Horses and stable management - Gas warfare - Attack and defense of positions - Trench orders
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Table 1. General Subjects for Lectures¹⁹

16 United States War Department. Document No. 656: Infantry Training. Prepared at the Army War College. August 1917, 13-15.

17 War Department Document No. 656.

18 War Department Document No. 656, 18-19.

19 War Department Document No. 656, 18-19.

Beyond outlining what subjects were to be covered during basic training and in what manner training should progress, *WDD 656* outlined a weekly schedule for the training of every Army Soldier. During the first four weeks of training, instruction was divided between developing the individual skills of the Soldiers and instruction in squad-level maneuvering. 70%, or 112 hours, of the first four weeks was dedicated toward in-processing the new recruits and imparting basic soldiering skills. During the first week, ten hours were dedicated to the issuance of clothing and equipment, along with lectures on the care of those items. During the second week of training, the Soldiers were issued their rifles, and they received instruction on the manual of arms and the care of the rifle.²⁰ During these introductory weeks, Soldiers received lectures on the articles of war, military discipline and courtesies, personal hygiene and care of feet, orders for sentinels, the obligations and rights of the soldier, countersigns and paroles, guard duty, the purpose of war, and the use of grenades and bombs. Also during this time, individual training addressed physical training exercises and running, drill and ceremony, saluting, marching, making packs and pitching tents, communicating via whistle and arm signals, administering first aid to the wounded, employing gases in modern warfare, and the use of bombs and grenades. During the second, third, and fourth weeks, Soldiers were introduced to bayonet exercises and bayonet combat, and after receiving their rifles in week 2, they familiarized themselves with their firearms through sighting, position, and aiming drills; deflection and elevation correction drills; trigger-squeeze exercises; and gallery practice.²¹



In conjunction with their individual training, Soldiers were introduced to the School of the Squad, during which they were grouped into squads of three to eleven Soldiers “for purposes of instruction, discipline, control, and order.”²² During the first four weeks of training, 48 hours, or 30% of the training time, was spent teaching teamwork and instilling a group mentality among the Soldiers. The squad became a fixed unit, and Soldiers learned to move and maneuver as a group.²³

During weeks five through eight of training, Soldier training expanded beyond the scope of squad-level instruction to address the functioning of the unit at the platoon level. On a platoon level, instruction reinforced the lessons taught to the squads, and it added close order drill; trench and open-warfare drills; musketry duties of the platoon and platoon leader; the use of rifle trenches; individual cooking; and anti-gas measures. Physical training, bayonet training, and anti-gas training continued as before, but 55% of training, or 89 hours, emphasized target practice, concepts of trench warfare, and platoon-level movements. Practical exercises in bombing and grenades were initiated during these weeks as were nighttime exercises. The fifth week of training was completed with a full field inspection of the field kit and pitched tent.²⁴

Training in the ninth and tenth weeks continued with an emphasis on fire superiority and instruction in trench warfare, but Soldiers graduated from platoon-level training to the School of the Company. Soldiers adapted the squad-level and platoon-level movements learned earlier to larger formations, and they began to maneuver in groupings of 100-200 Soldiers. In School of the Company, Soldier training focused on trench warfare; inspections; physical training; marching; antigas instruction; bayonet training; and known-distance and small-arms firing range practice.²⁵

In the eleventh week of training, specialists were selected as hand grenadiers, rifle grenadiers, snipers, sketchers, signalers, runners, observers, estimators, and automatic rifle and light machine gun manners, and in the twelfth week of

20 Infantry Drill Regulations, 30.

21 War Department Document No. 656, 20-21.

22 Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911:36.

23 War Department Document No. 656, 20-21.

24 War Department Document No. 656, 21-22.

25 War Department Document No. 656, 22-23.

instruction, light machine guns and automatic rifles were introduced to training.²⁶ Training began to combine and coordinate the combat tactics of specialized forces, and the Soldiers learned to maximize their effectiveness through the application of combined arms. Training through the end of instruction, through weeks 12-16, continued at the company level, and Soldiers put into practice the combat principles outlined in the Field Service Regulations, particularly the importance of fire superiority and of unity of command.²⁷



WWI Training Trench Camp Meade 1918

The daily schedule of training ran from 0730 to 1700. Lunch was held from 1130-1300. Basic training on Wednesday and Saturday ended at 1130 so that brigade commanders, staff officers, and regimental field officers could receive tactical instruction from the division commander. Saturday mornings were reserved for inspections, and there was no training on Sundays. Monday through Saturday, Soldiers engaged in 30-60 minutes of physical training during the midmorning, unless they were required to march to the firing ranges that day for target practice. Generally speaking, platoons rotated through the firing ranges, spending one morning or afternoon during the week on target practice. The rest of the week was divided into thirty-minute instructive blocks during which Soldiers were educated on that week's learning objectives.²⁸

Coming into World War I, the Army felt that “[t]o be effective in time of war, military training must be uniform throughout the service and must conform to certain basic principles possessing varying degrees of importance.”²⁹ The strategy espoused in *WDD 656* of a unified training program for Soldiers was revolutionary and is the basis of today's training program. Unfortunately, the questionable execution of the training in 1917 and 1918 severely hampered the efficacy of the program. Field Marshall Douglas Haig, England's senior officer during WWI and commander of the British Expeditionary Forces, commented in his diary on October 19, 1918 (less than a month before the end of WWI) “American Army: is not yet organized; it is ill-equipped, half-trained, with insufficient supply services. Experienced officers and NCOs are lacking.”³⁰ The French shared Haig's sentiments, “To sum up, the state of instruction in the United States is not brilliant in spite of the efforts made... to improve it.”³¹ Even the American leadership expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of Soldier coming out of the training programs. George C. Marshall, the training and operations director for the 1st Division during the war, complained about the lack of clothing, quarters, and motor transport for the men in training.³² Marshall retrospectively commented, “[It was] difficult to carry out any operation exactly according to [the ideal] because of the limited amount of training and complete lack of experience on the part of the men and the young officers.”³³ General John Pershing, General-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), excused the inexperience and lack of technical skills of the American troops with the indomitable American spirit, admitting, “It was thought reasonable to count on the vigor and the aggressive spirit of our troops to make up in a measure for their inexperience.”³⁴ Despite the War Department's best efforts to develop an efficient and effective training program, there were a number of factors that contributed to the program's shortfalls.

26 War Department Document No. 656, 23.

27 Field Service Regulations, 67.

28 War Department Document No. 656, 25.

29 War Department Document No. 656, 8

30 Robert Blake, ed. *The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919*. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952): 333.

31 Report, French GHQ, 1 January 1918, Subject: State of American Army on January 1, 1918, as quoted in US Army, Historical Division, *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1948), III, 256-57.

32 Cray, Ed. *General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman*. (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 57.

33 Marshall, George C. *Memoirs of My Services in the World War 1917-1918*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976): 122.

34 Pershing, John J. *My Experiences in the World War, Vol. 2*(New York: Stokes, 1931): 293.

First, there was a disagreement in the Army's leadership as to the guiding doctrine of training.³⁵ The War Department and the War College were under the impression that "[i]n all the military training of a division, under existing conditions, training for trench warfare is of paramount importance," and they published all of the training literature with that doctrine in mind.³⁶ However, Gen. Pershing, who ultimately determined the fighting strategy of the AEF, felt that "the ultimate success of the army depends upon their proper use in open warfare."³⁷ Pershing felt that the defensive strategy inherent in trench warfare had brought the European war to a stalemate, and in order to be victorious, the American Army would need the aggressive spirit espoused in open warfare, "the clash of units in a war of movement."³⁸ After seeing *WDD 656* and the War Department's training intentions, Pershing responded negatively: "I invite attention to and repeat my recommendations...that intensive training in all phases of open warfare be accepted as the principal mission of divisions before embarkation...It is urged that future programs of training for divisions in the United States be prepared accordingly."³⁹ Therefore, on one hand, division commanders were receiving instructions and training literature from the War Department to structure their training with trench warfare in mind, while on the other hand they were receiving orders from their chain of command to structure training with open warfare in mind.



A Typical Training Battalion Barrack

Second, there was a shortage of equipment for the Soldiers in training. America was unprepared for World War I. In April 1917, the United States Army had 787,000 rifles in its inventory.⁴⁰ A majority of these weapons were sent to Europe to supply the men in the American Expeditionary Forces, leaving obsolete weapons or nothing for the Soldiers in training. At Camp Doniphan, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Soldiers complained about not receiving rifles until the fourth month of training; their training was completed with broomsticks during drill.⁴¹ Other divisions had wooden rifles manufactured that mimicked the size of the real rifles because of the shortage of weapons to issue.⁴² Soldiers in the 82nd Division were simply given 4-inch boards to cut out their own training rifles. Machine gun companies routinely arrived in France having never fired a machine gun.⁴³ For anti-gas training, divisions would only have a couple of gas masks to share among the hundreds of trainees.⁴⁴ Soldiers complained over the non-issue of winter uniforms, and throughout the Army, Soldiers complained about the quality and quantity of food that was available at the training camps.⁴⁵ Due to these shortages of essential supplies and equipment for the Soldiers, training programs were delayed or modified, and Soldiers arrived in Europe never having received the proper instruction.

Third, there was a shortage of personnel for the Soldiers in training. To incorporate draftees into divisions, the Army adopted a strategy of initially organizing a number of divisions at skeleton strength and then parceling out inductees among them each month to fill out the numbers. This meant that Soldiers in divisions were perpetually at varying degrees of proficiency as new recruits were brought in. Training was constantly put on hold to accommodate the new Soldiers. To make matters worse, if a division was set to embark for France and was not at full strength, then their numbers would be bolstered with new volunteers and draftees or personnel from other divisions.

35 Rainey, 1992: 91-92.

36 War Department Document No. 656, 5.

37 Cablegram No. 228-S, 19 October 1917, Report of chief of Artillery, AEF, Inclosures-Part II, "Field Artillery Training," pg. 15, Folder 382, Commander-in-Chief reports, Entry 22, RG 120, NA.

38 Rainey, James W. "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I." *Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College* 13:3 (September 1983): 35.

39 "Report of G-5 [AEF], Appendix 31, Divisional Training," National Archives, Records Group 120, Entry 22, folder 246; USA/WW, XIV, 311-312.

40 Rainey, 1992: 92.

41 Johnson, 1992: 95.

42 Johnson, 1992: 97, 100.

43 Rainey, 1992: 92.

44 Rainey, 1992: 93.

45 Johnson, 1992: 95.

In this manner, fully trained divisions would be carved up to fulfill the needs of embarking units, to the detriment of both divisions.⁴⁶ Upon review, Pershing remarked of the personnel policies: “Divisions of 25,000 men, which should have been held intact, and each one perfected as an organized team, were constantly called upon to send large groups of their soldiers to other duties...All this was discouraging to their officers, disastrous to morale, threw upon the AEF an extra burden of training, and resulted in our having a number of divisions only partially trained when the time came to use them.”⁴⁷

never considered a career as a Soldier and who had no knowledge of soldiering skills, and an unprecedented number of trained Soldiers was required within a very narrow margin of time. The Army War College during World War I went beyond General Order No. 44 of 1906 – a vague outline of the skills required from Soldiers—to develop a standardized training program for every U.S. Army Soldier. This training program dictated the subject matter to be covered in training, the duration of instruction for each topic discussed, and a timeline for training progression. While individual divisions were still ultimately responsible for the training of their Soldiers, a guiding document was finally available for them to follow. While many of the particulars of the training program have evolved over the years, the foundational principles of patriotism, discipline, physical development, self-respect, self-reliance, resourcefulness, professional knowledge, and field service efficiency remain the same today.



Company Street, First Provisional Regiment, Camp Jackson, Columbia, S.C. 222839

In terms of transforming civilians into proficient Soldiers, the effectiveness of the World War One training program is difficult to evaluate, but the program developed in 1917 was foundational in the development of the basic combat training program that exists today. In April 1917, when the United States entered World War I, the Army faced an unknown training obstacle: technological advancements in Europe were dramatically altering the tactics of war, the Selective Service Act of 1917 was bringing men into the Army who had

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46 Rainey, 1992: 93-94.

47 Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War, Vol. 1 (New York: Stokes, 1931):380.

48 WDD 656, 8-10; Headquarters Department of the Army. FM 7-0: Training for Full Spectrum Operations. (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2008); Headquarters Department of the Army. TRADOC Pamphlet 600-4: The Soldier's Blue Book, The Guide for Initial Entry Training Soldiers (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010); Headquarters Department of the Army. Soldier Training Publication

IMPLEMENTATION OF RECONDITIONING PROGRAMS IN THE INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

SSG JOSEPH TERRY

The occurrence of injuries during Physical Readiness Training (PRT) in Basic Combat Training (BCT) is something that all leaders strive to prevent, however when they happen leaders must be prepared to deal effectively with the injured Soldier and give them the best opportunity to recover and return to training in a quick and efficient manner. The proper implementation of a Special Conditioning Program in BCT will consist of focusing on precision to prevent injuries, properly utilizing our Athletic Trainers and Physical Therapy assets, and ensure

cadre knowledge of modified PRT exercises and familiarity with medical profiles. Returning Soldiers to training as quickly as possible should be a Commander's primary focus when addressing the problem of already injured Soldiers.


Before discussing ideas regarding the implementation of a reconditioning program it is essential to address the most important aspect of injured Soldiers and that is to prevent them from becoming injured in the first place. The physical fitness level of a Soldier plays a large factor in their likelihood of becoming injured. An under-motivated and unfit trainee is more likely to be physically challenged by the rigors of Basic Combat Training, but a highly-motivated and fit trainee can push them self to the point of injury as well. It is for this reason that the principles of Precision, Progression and Integration were formed, in order to facilitate maximum training effort and gain despite the different physical fitness levels of Soldiers in Initial Entry Training. The implementation of the Physical Readiness Training Program and its official acceptance as Army doctrine allowed for great strides to be made in the prevention of overuse training injuries. In a study published in 2003, the precursor to the PRT program was tested alongside the old standard BCT Physical Training program and showed that the PRT program "resulted in a lower risk of overuse injuries, higher first-time pass rates on the APFT

and a lower rate of APFT failure when compared to traditional physical training." Precision is the fundamental principle of all Physical Readiness Training and should be emphasized at all times. Proper precision must not only be taught but also shown and reinforced from day one of introducing Soldiers to PRT. One example of lack of precision

leading to injuries is the method of conducting the Shuttle Sprint exercise in Military Movement Drill One. If, when reaching the end of the "shuttle run" the Soldier does not stop, turn, and align their foot in the new direction of

travel, then this imprecise movement could lead to greater injuries after repeated abuse later. This is just one example to show how the principle of precision is the foundation to injury prevention in PRT.

FM 7-22, Army Physical Readiness Training, Chapter 6 Special Conditioning Programs, states "Rehabilitation and reconditioning programs within IMT are currently conducted at all Army Training Centers as a part of the Physical Training (PT) and rehabilitation program (PTRP). The purpose of the PTRP is to provide physical rehabilitation and physical conditioning for Soldiers who are injured during BCT or OSUT, these programs usually fall under the training command and act independently under the supervision of a physical therapist. Soldiers remain in the PTRP until they are capable of returning to the same phase of BCT/OSUT that they left or as a "new start" at day one of IMT. If an injury is minor and only requires short-term limitations (with minimal impact to training); it may not require assignment to the PTRP." The most recent version of TR 350-6 re-named the PTRP, WTRP: Warrior Training and Rehabilitation Program. When an injured Soldier does not qualify for WTRP, it becomes important for BCT leaders to ensure the reconditioning of that Soldier at the BCT unit. Unlike the Sustaining Phase of PRT where there is an appointed Reconditioning Program Leader and dedicated plan to help



Components of the IET Reconditioning Program

implement the program, in the Toughening Phase of BCT leaders do not always have the resources or time to train injured Soldiers. This often leads to injured Soldiers just walking laps around a track or guarding weapons. This is the wrong answer and should not be allowed. The majority of our BCT Battalions have Athletic Trainers on staff and some even have certified Master Fitness Trainers to assist in this reconditioning process. The Master Fitness Trainer must assist and advise the Commander in implementing a Reconditioning Program and to help the Commander bridge the gap between injured Soldiers and medical support. Modeling the Sustaining Phase Reconditioning Program, an adequate solution is to have the Battalion Athletic Trainers oversee the Level One portion of the reconditioning program which is outlined in FM 7-22, Chapter 6, Paragraph 6-17. The Athletic Trainer is well suited for this task as they already oversee the training of injured Soldiers and most have access to the minimum required strength and endurance training machines. This approach would allow unit-level subject matter experts to progress Soldiers back to the point where they can return to scheduled unit PRT. Level Two of the reconditioning program would be conducted in the unit. Injured Soldiers who are released from level one would resume PRT activities with the unit. They would perform modified exercises IAW Chapter 6 in order to facilitate their full rehabilitation. The key component to Level Two is the knowledge and competency of the cadre conducting the training. Leaders and instructors must be knowledgeable of all the modified exercises as well as how to correctly read and interpret the profile form. The most reasonable way to ensure that all cadre and leaders have this knowledge is to conduct extensive training on the modified exercises and the profile form which would be best accomplished during reset between cycles.

It is the Battalion Commander's and Command Sergeant's Major responsibility to ensure through the proper use of available assets and personnel that injured Soldiers are effectively rehabilitated and returned to training. As per paragraph 6-27, of FM 7-22, *"The reconditioning program is the Commander's program. A well-run program will assist force reconstitution efforts. The success of the program is dependent on the priority placed on it from the top down. Company Commanders and First Sergeants must care enough about the program to*

ensure NCO support." While the welfare of Soldiers is every leader's job, the Army has left no room for doubt as to who is to be held accountable for the reconditioning of injured Soldiers. This is to ensure that there is a vested interest from the Chain of Command in making sure injured Soldiers are returned to training as quickly as possible.

Figure 6-4 provides an easy to follow example of the progression an injured Soldier must follow. This provides Commanders with a reference to determine where the Soldier is in the reconditioning process.



Figure 6-4. Rehabilitation and reconditioning responsibilities

In conclusion, the requirement for implementing a Reconditioning Program in Basic Combat Training is not as clear-cut as that for the Sustaining Phase. However, with the creative application of local resources, it is still feasible. PRT principles, especially precision are used to reduce the risk of injuries but if injuries do occur and WTRP is not an option, Level One Reconditioning can be properly conducted by unit Athletic Trainers. Level Two can be conducted at the unit allowing for the maximization and efficiency of time and resources while still focusing on returning the Soldier to training as quickly as possible. Ultimately, Commanders and NCO's are held responsible for this program to ensure that all are invested in the welfare of the injured Soldier and maintaining the force. And as leaders we must always remember *"When Soldiers become ill, injured, or have other medical conditions, leaders have the responsibility to recondition these Soldiers and safely return them to duty at an equal or higher physical fitness level."*
 ----- COL William R. Rieger, Commandant, U.S. Army Physical Fitness School, 1999-2006.

SSG Joseph Terry is a Drill Sergeant in Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade

1 Knapik, JJ., Hauret, KG., Arnold, S., Canham-Chervak, M., Mansfield, AJ., Hoedebecke, EL., McMillian, D. (2003). Injury and fitness outcomes during implementation of Physical Readiness Training. *International Journal of Sports Medicine*, 24, p. 372-381

2 U.S. Army Physical Fitness School. (2013). *Army Physical Readiness Training (FM 7-22)*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.



SINGLE PARENT ON THE TRAIL

SFC Angela Bowley

No one ever said life on the trail would be easy. Going into it you expect long hours, hard work, and the perpetual monotony of cycle after cycle of training Soldiers. But nothing can prepare you for the journey you are about to embark on. Some of us are single, others are married. Some of us have five or more children and a spouse. Others, like me, are single parents. Before I got my orders, I could not fathom Drill Sergeant Branch putting a single parent on the trail. After all, recruiters cannot be sole parents, so why would they allow Drill Sergeants to be? Is it possible to be a good Drill Sergeant and a great single parent?

When I first received my orders for Drill Sergeant School I was in shock. How could I possibly be a Drill Sergeant as a single parent? How could I make this work? I carefully weighed all of my options. Option #1: my child stays with me and I find some extended hour daycare or nanny to get through the next two years. Option #2: send my child to stay with grandparents for the next two years. Option #3: do everything in my power to get out of this assignment.

After careful consideration, I chose option number one. I couldn't fathom the idea of missing out on two years of my child's life. Option three was out the window as well. The Army Values inculcated in me for the past 12 years would not allow me to quit when presented with a challenge. So I went with option number one, and prayed that it would work out. I've been at this for a year now and dealt with the up's and down's, but overall I am still satisfied with my choice.

My day begins at 0300 on most days. I wake up extra early to get my PT in and get the little one up and ready for daycare. Before I became a Drill Sergeant, my child would sleep in his own room. Since we got here and our time together is limited, he's reverted back to sleeping next to me because that's the only time he gets to be with his mom. I'm too tired to fight it and with the limited amount of time I get to sleep, it's not a battle I choose to fight.

Once I drop him off at daycare at 0430, he knows he won't see me again till about 2100. There were many days in the beginning where that 0430 drop-off was quite traumatizing, for him and for me. I swear he felt like I wasn't going to come back. He would scream and cry and cling to me as if it was the last time he would ever see me. I could hear him screaming still even outside of the daycare. I couldn't even walk out of a room without him following me because he was scared I was leaving him. It took about six months of this routine before he realized that I would always be back.

Every late night or overnight duty that I have, my child also has. He spends those nights on an air mattress in the back of the daycare. While the staff provides excellent care for him on those overnights, I still feel terrible having to leave him there. There are no bathing facilities there so all he gets is a "bird-bath". Depending on the training that is going on, sometimes he's there for as many as 3-5 nights in a row.

When he's sick, he is sent home. Since there is no one else to care for him, I too get sent home. It always seems to be on those days where you are

already short on manning. Every time I see an incoming call from the daycare, I dread that they are going to say to come pick him up. I know the effect that it has on my battle buddies and training when I am pulled unexpectedly to care for my child, but there is no one else to take care of him.

Then of course there is the constant worry in the back of my head of will this have a long-term effect on my child? Will he remember his mom being gone all of the time? Will it affect his future relationships? The daycare can be unknowingly cruel when they call your chain of command concerned that you have to work every federal holiday and you don't spend enough time with your child, as if we have a choice. So in turn, I devote all of my time that I'm not at work, which is not much time at all, to spend quality time with him. I sacrifice my personal and social needs to be the best parent that I can be. I don't go out because I don't want to leave him with a babysitter when he already spends way too much time at daycare.



I work hard to ensure that my home stays clean and organized. I have come up with a system to get my laundry done in "phases" since sometimes we go for a whole month or more without a day off. I try to get my laundry into the washer when I get home from work. If I can manage to stay awake long enough to get through the wash phase, then I'll move onto the dry phase. Most nights I cannot, and dry phase waits until the next day. Sometimes the fold and put away phase takes days. I run full loads in the dishwasher of just cups because I never eat a home cooked meal. A few months ago I decided to off-set the work load a little and hired a maid to come clean every other week to spare me from vacuuming and other time consuming tasks.


So what is it that drives us to continue on this path for two years? Where do we find the motivation to get us through 24 months here? Is it the end state that you are looked upon as a subject matter expert in all things when you go back to your MOS? Is it the career progression that goes alongside earning and keeping your Drill Sergeant badge? Is it the satisfaction that you are shaping the future of today's Army? Whatever it is, we just do it. We do what needs to be done. We snatch up those curveballs that get thrown at us. We learn to excel in times when others flounder. We develop into better leaders and Soldiers.

Is it possible to be a good Drill Sergeant and a great single parent? The answer is yes. You have to find a good balance between work and the time you have with your child. You make every moment count. You remember that this is not forever. You embrace the suck and hold on for the wild ride that you are about to get on. While extremely challenging and demanding, in the end this job is ultimately rewarding. We are writing our own future. We are training those that will replace us. When times get hard we remember that badge on our chest and rub it. We pour our heart and soul into being a good Drill Sergeant because it goes hand and hand with being a good parent. We strive to be the best of the best for our children to make them proud and show them that they can accomplish any task with a little bit of hard work and a lot of motivation. We prove that we have the right to call ourselves Drill Sergeants.

THIS WE'LL DEFEND

SFC Angela Bowley is a Drill Sergeant in Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade

It's All About Attitude



When baseball great Ty Cobb was 70, a reporter asked him, “What do you think you’d hit if you were playing these days?”

Cobb, who had a lifetime batting average of .367, said, “About .290, maybe .300.”

The reporter replied, “That’s because of the travel, the night games, the artificial turf, and all the new pitches like the slider, right?”

“No,” said Cobb, “it’s because I am seventy.”

Now that’s believing in yourself!



Just One More Telephone Pole

Fall down seven times, get up eight times

Japanese Proverb

Having lost his right leg to cancer, Terry Fox embarked on a cross-Canada run called the Marathon of Hope in 1980 to raise money for cancer research. His shuffle and hop running style took him about 24 miles per day - close to a complete 26-mile marathon every single day- with an artificial leg! He managed to run for 143 days and covered 3,339 miles from his starting point in St. John's, Newfoundland, to Thunder Bay, Ontario, where he was forced to abandon his run when doctors discovered cancer in his lungs. He died a few months later, but his inspiring example has left a legacy, annual Terry Fox runs held in Canada and around the world that so far have raised \$340 million for cancer research. When asked how he kept himself going as exhaustion set in and he had thousands of miles ahead of him, he answered, **"I just keep running to the next telephone pole."**



Everything I Needed to Know About Values I Learned in Basic Combat Training

LTC (R) Gerald Henderson

Ask a leader or trainer assigned to a basic combat training unit, “what is the most critical task that a Soldier must master before they graduate Basic Combat Training?” Most likely the majority of your responses are centered on a Soldier’s ability to qualify with and maintain their assigned rifle. Hit what they shoot at, one shot, one kill and several other mantras that we have all grown up with. We’ll spend hours discussing it, experiment with all aspects of it, create drills for muscle memory, conduct hours of pre- marksmanship training, concurrent training and remedial training. Our end of cycle AARs and QTBs typically spend most of the discussion analyzing results, effectiveness and ways to improve. We have training aids, devices and simulations, hundreds of thousands of dollars invested in it. We devote a total of 130.9 hours to rifle marksmanship. Others will answer the same question with physically and mentally fit Soldiers, the ability to pass the Army Physical Readiness Test. It’s the first and most important thing we do every day. We close roads for it, test it, have remedial programs, pre and post partum programs, profile programs and devote 54 hours of POI time to it. The last one and typically a distant third is first aid, the ability to save a fellow Soldiers life. We spent years wrestling with the combat lifesaver’s program. We have simulators that spurt blood, will actually die if not treated properly, a great facility that replicates sounds, sights and smells of the battlefield; we incorporate and reinforce it into our FTXs. We devote 26 hours total hours to these skills.

Now ask that leader where do Army values fit into that pecking order? Of the skills that we train, most of which are extremely perishable, which skills are the ones least suitable for the unit of first assignment to address or for that matter advanced individual training? What skills if not mastered, ruin careers and Families, blemish our Army and nation or result in tragedies that we spend countless resources analyzing and developing prevention programs. Whether in time of war or time of peace, but I would argue even more so in time of war, the answer is : Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage, our Army Values, yet total POI time devoted to values training is 9.7 hours.


Obviously we spend more time on teaching values than a little under ten hours, but my question would be, “are we getting this right? Do we shy away from it because it is difficult to see or to measure?” How do we get Soldiers to “espouse” the Army’s Values in ten weeks? Understand that espouse requires more than memorization, more than giving the answer that they think is required of them. By definition, espouse means that a Soldier adopts those values, takes them as their own and supports them as a cause, becomes attached to them with a close synonym being adopt. If you research the topic of character or value education, most of what you will find is tied to teaching children and young adults within our public schools. One quote that I found telling is by John Holt , “ Teachers and schools tend to mistake good behavior for good character. What they prize is docility, suggestibility; the child who will do

what he is told. They value most in children what children least value in themselves. Small wonder that their effort to build character is such a failure; they don't know it when they see it." Now many will probably say that doesn't apply to us, because we are dealing with adults, but I'd counter that most of the young men and women that fill our ranks are very recent products of that environment.

What I found most interesting was what most researchers found that didn't work. Much of what is described in our school system can best be described as indoctrination. Educators attempt to force students into specific behaviors rather than put those students in situations that force them to think, to analyze their behavior, reflect upon it and how its impacts on those around them. Reading more on the topic, you learn about failed strategies that equate to practices like "if today is Monday, then it must be personal courage day." Others include offering students rewards when you "catch" them demonstrating a value. The fall back to this particular approach is that behavior is no longer tied to the value, but more tied to the reward, so the reward can undermine the whole process of what we are trying to achieve. The techniques described could potentially provide temporary, albeit minimal success, but it will not create a commitment to that behavior. Studies go on to say that the student must be given the opportunity to take these concepts, reflect upon them, view them in relation to their own experiences and internalize them.

If we look at our methods of training, do we see similarities to the above? When prioritizing and providing resources, in this case time, where do our values and our profession of arms stack up? Have you ever heard any leader discuss concurrent or remedial values training? Have you ever heard of anyone assessing values in their Soldier Training Evaluation Programs (STEP) or heard a commander state in an end of cycle AAR, "Sir this cycle, five Soldiers were sent home and four were restarted for their inability to grasp and adopt our values?" Have you ever heard anyone talk about reinforcing values in an STX or FTX? Have you ever heard a commander say "this cycle we are going to execute a pilot in order to better train our Soldiers on values?" Do any of our cadre certification tasks address the ability to teach values?

As you look to address those questions, reflect upon this excerpt from TRADOC Regulation 350-6, Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Procedures regarding transforming civilians into Soldiers: "Immersion into an environment that embodies values, personal conduct, self-discipline, motivation, and task performance. Application of this critical concept ensures Soldiers learn through the example of everyone with whom they have contact and every activity in which they participate in or observe. Consistently and broadly applied, the IET environment will demonstrate the practical application of the professional military ethic and serve to establish the Army's standards for conduct, discipline, and relationships. The leaders and trainers Soldiers observe during their IET experience must be examples of proper military conduct and performance. Where the desired environment is in contrast to a Soldier's background or experience, it provides the basis for positive change, exemplifying in meaningful ways what is required to be a successful Soldier. When a Soldier's environment or behavior differs from the desired actions, leaders discuss and demonstrate the Army's expectations and standards. This immersion requires Soldiers to demonstrate Army values and put them into practice, how Army standards apply in performance and discipline, and provides for a fundamental change in human behavior."



That paragraph alone provides you with one very critical component of how we achieve success with Soldiers' adopting our values.... Our personal example. Ask yourself what does that Soldier see with their eyes, do they see what we tell them to see or do they see what we demonstrate? When a Soldier watches a Drill Sergeant knowingly look the other way, when their "Battle" behaves

inappropriately, how will they view integrity and personal courage? When cadre berate them, belittle them because of their gender, where they are from, curse them, refer to them as SIT, as opposed to PVT or Soldier, how do they come to grips with respect? If they overhear you making fun of your chain of command, griping about what you have to do, complaining about the installation, the Army, how will they model loyalty, duty or selfless service? Chances are they won't. They will become the Soldier they see modeled, much like the example that shaped them as adults in the image of their parents.....same values, same mannerisms, same vocabulary, same methods of problem solving. Albert Schweitzer said, "Example is not the main thing in influencing others. It is the only thing." Do we believe that? Do we use the most available tool that we have to assist us with the most critical task assigned to us, or do we resemble more of what Francis Bacon describes, "He that gives good advice, builds with one hand; he that gives good counsel and example, builds with both; but he that gives good admonition and bad example, builds with one hand and pulls down with the other."

Soldiers' eyes are open about seventeen hours a day, so there is a potential there for about 100 hours of values training per week, close to a 1000 per cycle. Multiply that by every leader that Soldier comes into contact with during a given day. The end result of the equation is a pretty powerful sum. Budget reductions won't impact it, you don't need a bus for it, nor does it create overuse injuries. We could say it just happens, but the reality is it doesn't just happen, the reality is that we don't see the power of our example. We don't see the opportunity to share experiences. When given the opportunity to look at a situation that occurred during the day and force the Soldier to think about it, reflect upon it and determine if our values were applied, we are probably more focused on the next training event. I attended the Master Army Profession and Ethics Trainer Course(MAPET) provided by the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE). It's a forty hour course designed to provide the Army with people capable of serving as facilitators in leader development programs designed to reinforce our Profession of Arms. Through the use of some simple, yet thought provoking video vignettes, the instructor forced us to gain new perspectives on how we think, behave and solve problems. So

much of what their curriculum provides is readily adaptable in any training environment and a part of their exportable TSPs provide for the values training in basic combat training.


As we begin another round of program of instruction (POI) revision and implementation, where will we take values training? How much thought and analysis will we devote to it? Will we look for ways to attempt to measure it or is that too hard. I "Googled" "values test" with interesting results. I actually took one that was offered. I was kind of impressed that by just choosing key words and prioritizing those key words, the program told me a great deal about myself. Now it could have been the equivalent of a psychic reading the lines on my palm, but I'd like to think that, if we as an Army chose to, we could develop an assessment tool that could potentially be used to determine pre and post levels of values. Of course there are other ways to measure if someone lives up to what they so easily memorize and recite. Ask those that know them best, their peers. Within the squad, ask them at the end of Red Phase, then again at the end of White Phase. What if peer evaluations were factored into a formula for graduation requirements? What if Soldiers were required to pass an oral exam that forced them to take personal experiences prior to enlistment and relate each to a value. They could be asked to describe how they viewed it then and now being a Soldier, how their viewpoint had changed and why. I understand that what I'm describing is difficult to measure and there is no guarantee we will get it right, but is it worth that effort and in the end will a Soldier proudly be able to say **"everything I learned about values, I learned at Fort Jackson"** and will we feel good about the Soldier that is saying it?

LTC (R) Gerald Henderson is the Deputy Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Jackson.



The difference between winning and losing
is most often... not quitting.

John Wooden



Vigilant in Inspecting: A Company Leader's Guide to Assessing Your Unit

COL Joseph McLamb

All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required...to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command.

AR 600-20, Army Command Policy 18 Apr 08

Commanders are directly responsible, and accountable, for all aspects of unit training. They directly observe and participate in the unit's training and leader development in order to better assess mission readiness and help their subordinates to improve.

ADP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders 23 Aug 12

In 1995, my brigade commander spent about 40 minutes on a range with the company I had been commanding for almost a year. It was his first visit to the unit during training, although many of my peers claimed that they were visited on an almost weekly basis. He had been on the range, a squad maneuver live fire range, for close to 20 minutes before someone told me he was there, and continued to watch quietly even after I had briefed him on the day's training. Just before he left, he pulled me off to the side and shared his observations of the unit, and I was astounded at the degree of detail - accurate detail - he had picked up in such a short period of time. He correctly identified the best platoon sergeant and the weakest squad leader in the company, provided some sage advice on the handling of a lieutenant that I was struggling to mentor, and explained how my unclear guidance to the first sergeant had hampered his ability to perform his duties on the range. Then he told me that I had a great company, and was well on my way to being a "pretty decent" company commander. As he walked away, I found myself wondering how in the world he had drawn so many disturbingly accurate conclusions in such a short period of time. What had he seen that I had not?

More than a decade later, I had just completed a particularly unpleasant conversation with my commanding general on a street in Baghdad, and was limping to my vehicle when the CG called me back. Softening his tone and looking me in the eye, he asked me why I was still wearing the old body armor and why my vehicle did not have the required electronic counter-measures. I explained that not all of the Soldiers in the battalion had the new body armor, and that we had more vehicles than electronic counter-measures. He nodded and sent me on my way, but that night the missing equipment arrived by helicopter. Once again I found myself wondering how a senior leader had noticed such small but critical details while simultaneously engaged in a fairly confrontational conversation with a battalion commander.

My brigade commander in 1995 and my commanding general in 2007 could not be more different in their leadership styles, personalities, or professional backgrounds. But they clearly shared a skill that all leaders can benefit from cultivating - when they looked at a unit, they really saw the unit. Years of experience had made them proficient at the art of inspecting, an art that appears to have atrophied in our Army over the past years and

that today's leaders would be wise to reinvigorate and practice. Leaders who wish to solve the problems in their unit must first become proficient at recognizing those problems. To be an effective leader, officer or NCO, you must master the art of inspecting; fortunately, this is a skill that anyone can attain through practice and determination.

A Rose By Any Other Name

If your vision of an inspection includes only ranks of Soldiers in dress uniforms, the first step to getting better is to rethink your terms. The truth is that a leader is inspecting *every single time* he interacts with a subordinate unit. Formal inspections are extremely rare when compared to the almost constant informal inspections that make up a large part of a leader's day.

In recent years, leaders have adopted a host of other terms to describe this informal approach to inspections, mostly as a result of the undue apprehension that subordinates feel when they hear the word "inspection." Battlefield circulation, leader reconnaissance, unit visitation, training observation, and several other commonly used terms are really just euphemisms for leaders inspecting their subordinates.¹

There is nothing wrong with these terms, as long as junior leaders understand what senior leaders are really doing, but perhaps we would be wise to remove the stigma from the term "inspection" and return it to its rightful place of honor in our lexicon. Two decades ago a company first sergeant telling his platoon sergeants that he would be "walking through" the motor pool that afternoon sent an unmistakable message, and the platoon sergeants would undoubtedly make sure their areas of responsibility were to standard before the first sergeant came around. Today, such a message might be lost on those receiving it. "I'll be inspecting the motor pool this afternoon" may be the phrase that clears the confusion and helps to make sure that neither the first sergeant nor the platoon sergeants get an ugly surprise.

Deciding Where to Look...and When

The best leaders I have known spent most of their time inspecting, teaching, coaching, and mentoring, but even if you devoted yourself to nothing else you would still find that you do not have enough time to inspect all that needs your attention. So how does a leader decide where to look?

A good rule of thumb is to start with training. Units that train well will do most everything else well, too, and units that are struggling in any area are likely to have a training deficiency as the root issue. The training schedule is a great place to start as you begin to think about what you will look at today.



Although there are multiple approaches to determining which training events you will visit, my personal preference has always been to select training events that require units or Soldiers to apply skills gained in earlier training. For example, watching a platoon live fire attack for only a few minutes will tell you a great deal about the squad training that was previously conducted on tasks such as support by fire, breach, and assault. If the platoon conducts the attack well, you can be confident that the platoon leader and platoon sergeant did a good job of training the squads. Conversely, if the platoon struggles in the attack, the problem is most likely poor squad training leading up to the attack. In a very real sense, the ability of the platoon leader to effectively lead the platoon attack is accurately predicted by his ability to train his subordinate squads on their squad-level tasks.

¹ LTG Arthur S. Collins, *Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1978), 56. More than thirty years after its first publication, this book remains the single best overview of training for Army leaders, and is particularly relevant as we enter a period of prolonged fiscal austerity and international uncertainty. Chapter 7, Training Yourself and the Chain of Command, is an invaluable resource for company commanders.

When we apply the same logic to the Basic Combat Training environment, the training events that are of greatest value for leader inspections are those that require Soldiers to apply skills already gained in previous training. The Buddy Team Live Fire and FTX III are classic examples. There are no new tasks trained in these events, so Soldier performance in these events is a direct reflection of the quality of training earlier in the cycle. If a platoon's Soldiers can perform the Buddy Team Live Fire to standard, you can be confident that the NCOs of the platoon did a good job of training all the individual tasks that come together for this event. If many Soldiers perform poorly, the problem is most likely the training they received prior to the event. An hour spent inspecting training at the Buddy Team Live Fire, therefore, can give a leader a great deal of insight into weeks of previous training.

Another great opportunity for leaders to inspect training comes during the morning physical training period. It is not by chance that senior leaders find joining a unit for PT an incredibly valuable experience: almost everything about a unit is on public display during PT, for those who care to look. The number of leaders present, their involvement in the exercises, the level of motivation within the formation, the precision with which Soldiers execute the exercises, the tone of leaders' instruction – these and other factors tell a leader much about the state of discipline and training in the organization, often within minutes. A unit that is good at PT might not be good everywhere, but a unit that is bad at PT is unlikely to be good anywhere. If you can only spend an hour inspecting today, do it during PT.



The truth, however, is that leaders almost never devote only an hour to inspecting. Instead, like the CG who questioned me in 2007, they are constantly inspecting, even while doing other things. An

experienced leader walking past the motor pool will almost instinctively look for chock blocks and oil pans, dirty windshields and flat tires. Passing through the DFAC, he will naturally check the hand-washing station, the lights over the eating areas, whether or not the latrines have soap and paper towels. Simply walking through the company area he will notice whether the grass needs to be cut, if there is trash on the ground, whether doors that are supposed to be secured are in fact locked. With practice, inspecting becomes almost second nature to leaders, a constant activity that requires only a small portion of the leader's conscious attention regardless of where the leader might be.

Even experienced leaders find it necessary to be deliberate about when they inspect, however. A good rule of them is that the frequency of inspection should increase as unpleasant environmental factors increase. Cold and rainy days, late and lonely evenings, distant and austere training areas – these are the conditions that should draw a leader's attention. Being present during adverse conditions not only gives a leader great insight into how his unit operates under stress, it also lets subordinate leaders gain confidence that their leaders fully understand and share in the less pleasant aspects of military service. Spend a couple of hours with a platoon in a summer downpour and you will learn a lot about the unit's leaders. And they will learn something about you.

If I Had Known You Were Coming...

All of which brings us to a question that once caused me great anxiety: should I let a subordinate unit know that I am coming to inspect? As a junior leader, I struggled to find a satisfactory answer to this question, but as I get older I find it less troubling. My answer now is simply *it depends*.

Formal inspections should almost always be announced in advance, with a fair degree of detail about what is to be inspected and what standards the unit is expected to meet. This gives subordinate leaders an opportunity to prepare for the inspection and meet those standards.

For informal inspections, my general rule is not to provide early notification of an inspection, except in two specific circumstances: 1) if the unit is conducting a new exercise or training event or has not had an adequate opportunity to prepare; or 2) there is a new subordinate leader who has not been previously inspected. Both of these situations tend

to make junior leaders rather anxious; the sudden, unexpected appearance of a more senior leader can create a sense of being overwhelmed. In those circumstances, letting the platoon or company leaders know that you plan to visit them is usually helpful.

With those exceptions, however, announcing an informal inspection in advance will usually only distract the inspected unit and negate the leader's ability to see how the unit is really doing. Even very competent and confident leaders are hard-pressed not to make adjustments to their activities when they hear that a more senior leader will be coming to training this afternoon. When leaders simply show up at good units, the units are generally glad to have been spared the extra work that comes with "getting ready" for a visit. Units that are struggling a bit may be less comfortable with unannounced visits.

How unannounced inspections are perceived is primarily driven by how you respond to what you find during the inspection, however. Most units will never relish an unannounced visit from a senior leader, but if the senior leader uses the inspection to teach, coach, and mentor – rather than belittle or demean – even poor units can find the unannounced inspection a useful experience.

Preparing

If you found the idea that leaders are *always* inspecting their subordinates an unappealing concept, it may be because you don't like the corresponding reality: subordinates are *always* inspecting their leaders. When you visit a subordinate unit, you can be certain that its leaders are watching you at least as closely as you are watching them.

Preparing for an inspection is perhaps the most important factor in making it worthwhile.² If you don't know what you are doing, subordinate leaders will recognize this almost immediately. On the other hand, leaders who *do* know what they are doing when conducting an inspection increase unit confidence in both the leader and unit itself.

The secret to being prepared is no secret at all. You simply have to do your homework, which mostly consists of checking the appropriate Army documents to familiarize yourself with what right looks like on any given topic. A commander's responsibilities are very broad, and no one expects you to be a subject matter expert on every aspect of military operations. They do expect that you will know enough to ask the right questions, however.



Interpreting What You See

When you arrive at a unit, however, your ability to assess the organization will begin long before you ask any questions. How a unit reacts to the presence of a leader at a training event will tell you a great deal about not only the on-going training, but the culture of the unit as a whole. Does the first leader who recognizes you walk over, introduce himself, and explain the unit's activity? If so, it is very likely that the unit's leaders are confident that they are training to standard. If, on the other hand, unit leaders attempt to move away in order to avoid a conversation, or simply pretend not to notice a leader is present, you are likely to find significant shortfalls in the training. Perhaps more importantly, you are likely to find that the unit chain-of-command has more significant issues.

In general, leaders see one of three things when they conduct an unannounced inspection. Very rarely, a leader will discover a unit that is completely outside of acceptable norms in training. Most often, this reflects a training deficiency among the unit's leaders – they simply don't know how to

2. COL Dandridge Malone, *Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1983), 130. Malone commanded an infantry battalion in Vietnam, and his book provides very practical leadership advice on a myriad of topics that continue to confront company commanders and first sergeants today.

train the task at hand to standard. Less frequently, poor training reflects a break down in the good order and discipline of the organization, and leaders have made a conscious decision to short-change the training in order to get done sooner, reduce the stress of the event, etc. Thankfully, finding a unit completely out of tolerance happens very, very infrequently.

Almost as infrequent is a leader inspection that reveals a unit to be completely to standard in all aspects of its training or operation. If you ever have this experience, enjoy it.

By far the most common result of an unannounced inspection is the discovery of a healthy mix of things the unit is doing well, things the unit needs to improve, and things the unit isn't even aware it is supposed to be doing. My personal experience has been that this description is accurate for about 95% of units I have visited, whether in TRADOC, FORSCOM, or combat. Most leader inspections reveal units that have both strengths and weaknesses. (Or, as one of my former senior leaders once said, "Being a little screwed up is normal.")

Now What Do I Do?

If you have prepared properly, you will discover that you begin to notice a lot of things that once passed under your gaze unrecognized. You may be a bit shocked at the deficiencies within your unit, once you learn to see them. But once you master the art of inspecting and can see your unit more clearly, what do you do with your observations?

On those rare occasions when the stars align and you find a unit firing on all eight cylinders, congratulate the leaders on their exceptional work and be on your way.

When you find a unit completely outside of acceptable performance, stop the training immediately and educate and recertify the leaders,

which may require that the unit reschedule the training event for a later time. This comes with all sorts of resourcing issues, and many leaders are hesitant to take such drastic action. More than two decades of experience convince me, however, that it is the correct response. Bad training is much harder to overcome than no training.

Thankfully, you will rarely encounter the need for such drastic action. In most cases, you will spend your time with the inspected unit praising some portion of the training and correcting other aspects by questioning, counseling, and coaching. The only real challenge for the inspecting officer is to communicate what the unit is doing well and where there is need of improvement. Doing only the former leads to complacency and acceptance of lower standards, while doing only the later undermines the confidence of the unit's leaders. Your conversations with leaders will likely cover a variety of issues, including proper resourcing, training management, and training techniques. My experience has been the most

valuable discussions also include a heavy focus on the people, particularly the subordinate leaders, who make up the unit. The best leaders I have known almost never treated training and leader development as separate issues, but saw them as two sides of the same coin.

Captain Jones Goes to Training

CPT Jones decided to check on the preliminary marksmanship instruction (PMI) being executed at the platoon level, and determined that she would visit 2nd Platoon. She started by examining the training schedule to determine what tasks were being trained, who was conducting the training, where they were conducting it, and what the correct uniform was. She pulled the appropriate field manuals and training support package, listed as references on the training schedule, and re-familiarized herself with the conditions and standards associated with the tasks being



trained. She also quickly reviewed the after action review from the last time her unit executed this training, reminding herself of the areas that needed improvement. Recognizing that the training included a specialized piece of equipment, the Laser Marksmanship Training System, she looked at Annex A of FM 3-22.9 to re-familiarize herself with the major components of the equipment and to briefly review the guidelines for the use of the system. Finally, remembering that the platoon had the company LMTV at the training site, she pulled out TM 9-2320-365-10 and familiarized herself with three of the preventive maintenance checks and services requirements for the vehicle. Getting into the published training uniform and grabbing her notebook, she moved to the training site.

She arrived at the site and was observing the PMI when SSG Baker saw her and gave her a brief overview of the training. She noticed that the Soldiers were in a different uniform than prescribed, but SSG Baker explained that the platoon sergeant, SFC Able, had modified the uniform based on the rising temperature before he left the training area to go to a dental appointment.



She thanked SSG Baker, adjusted her uniform, and walked over to one of the training lanes where Soldiers were executing the target box drill. She noticed the Soldiers were cycling through the lane quickly, and asked one of the Soldiers to describe the standard for the drill. The Soldier explained that SSG Baker had told him that the target box drill was “really a waste of time” and the Soldiers should just spend a few minutes on it before moving to more useful training, because “otherwise we will be out here all day.” When she asked SSG Baker about the standard for the target box drill, he replied that he wasn’t really sure. She asked to see the appropriate manual, but SSG Baker explained

that he had left the range box, containing all the appropriate manuals, back at the company. Using the notes she had taken in preparation for the visit, CPT Jones explained the standards for the execution of the target box, and directed SSG Baker to implement those standards on the lane. SSG Baker appeared ready to argue, but then agreed and moved over to the target box lane.

CPT Jones moved to the LMTS, which was still being unboxed when she walked up. She noticed that SSG Carter, supervising the LMTS site, had a list of components and was inventorying them as they came out of the box. She asked SSG Carter how effective the LMTS really is, and SSG Carter responded that it mostly depends upon the competence of the leader using the training aid. When CPT Jones asked for clarification, SSG Carter spent 10 minutes showing her the best techniques for employing the LMTS, and described several common practices that unintentionally degrade the value of the training. SSG Carter said that he had never used the system before coming to the company, but that SFC Able had taken two hours during the last Reset period to teach him how to use the system and how to care for the equipment, and that the correct use of the system really seemed to be helping Soldiers master the fundamentals of marksmanship. CPT Jones thanked SSG Carter for the class, and asked if there was anything SSG Carter needed to make the training more effective. “Getting the equipment out here on time would be great,” he responded. “Apparently there was some screw-up with the LMTV this morning and the training aids arrived after the Soldiers did.” CPT Jones agreed to look into the matter, and again thanked SSG Carter.

Walking over to the parked LMTV, she reviewed the dispatch (which was up to date) and checked the engine oil (it was low). By now she was not surprised to see that SSG Baker had driven the vehicle to training that morning.

As CPT Jones considered her next action, she realized that she had only been with the platoon for 30 minutes, but had seen a great deal. She noticed SFC Able walking up to the training site, returning from his dental appointment, and made a quick mental list of things that she wanted to discuss with him:

- The platoon's risk management system was working very well, and the unit had made a timely and appropriate adjustment to changing weather conditions.
- The target box training was not to standard, and more importantly the NCO in charge didn't seem to know the standard. Perhaps he had not been adequately rehearsed and certified, but given the attention SFC Able had given to training SSG Carter on the LMTS, it seemed unlikely.
- The LMTS training was first rate, reflecting both SSG Carter's personal competence and SFC Able's leader development efforts.
- The platoon's command supply discipline looked good, as evidenced by SSG Carter's inventorying the components of the LMTS.
- On the other hand, the platoon's attention to PMCS, or vehicle maintenance at least, was suspect, as no one had identified and corrected the faulty oil level.
- Overall, the platoon seemed to be doing well, but all of her concerns for the unit seemed to have one thing in common – SSG Baker. He had failed to bring the appropriate training references, did not properly PMCS his vehicle, and was not aware of and did not enforce training standards. She decided to get SFC Able's assessment of SSG Baker's performance to determine if her observations were an anomaly or part of a larger pattern. If SFC Able also expressed concern over SSG Baker's performance, it would be time to determine the underlying issue.

Closing Thoughts

Learning to inspect a unit, particularly in an informal setting, is one of the most valuable skills that an officer or senior NCO can attain. This skill, typically gained while serving at the company level, will prove beneficial throughout a lifetime of service. Once a leader moves above the company echelon, he will find that information about the unit increasingly comes from digital displays, written reports, and printed charts. But the best and most reliable way to assess and improve your organization remains the skill that you learned as a company commander or first sergeant – personal inspection and interaction with the unit in the conduct of its duties.

COL Joseph McLamb is the Commander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (Basic Comat Training) at Fort Jackson.



LEADERSHIP



Much of what I have said has been by way of repetition of one thought which I wish you gentlemen to carry with you to your new duties. You will be responsible for a unit in the Army of the United States in this great emergency. Its quality, its discipline, its training will depend on your leadership. Whatever deficiencies there are must be charged to your failure or incapacity. Remember this: The truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to be overcome. The lack of equipment, the lack of food, the lack of this or that are only excuses; the real leader displays his quality in his triumphs over adversity, however great it may be.

General of the Army George C. Marshall, 27 September 1941, address to the first graduates of the U. S. Army's Officer Candidate Schools, subsequently published in The Army and Navy Register, 4 October 1941.

TRUST



AMERICA'S ARMY
OUR PROFESSION



<http://CAPE.ARMY.MIL>



America's Army – Our Profession


Stand Strong - Fiscal Year 2014

In October 2010, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army directed the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), to conduct a critical review to assess how protracted years of war impacted members of the Profession of Arms. This Army-wide review took the form of a year-long campaign of learning with focus groups at 5 major installations, 15 symposiums and 2 Army-wide surveys that reached more than 40,000 members of the active and reserve components and the DA Civilian Corps. The results of this assessment led to the development of this program.


The FY14 America's Army – Our Profession "Stand Strong" Program began on 1 October 2013 and continues throughout the fiscal year. The focus for the first six months (through March 2014) is on [Trust](#); and the last six months (through September 2014) will focus on [Honorable Service and Stewardship](#) of the Army Profession. Accordingly, the 1st QTR of the FY14 America's Army – Our Profession, "Stand Strong" Program overlaps with the continuing CY13 America's Army – Our Profession, Education and Training Program, 4th QTR Theme of Trust.

Trust is the bedrock upon which the United States Army grounds its relationship with the American people. Trust reflects the confidence and faith that the American people have in the Army to effectively and ethically serve the Nation, while resting assured that the Army poses no threat to them (ADRP 1 17).


Center for the Army Profession and Ethics (CAPE) Suggested Readings on TRUST




In Love and War
Jim and Sybil
Stockdale




George Washington on
Leadership
Richard Brookhiser



Defeat into Victory
Field Marshall William
Viscount Slim



In Search of Ethics
Len Marrella



Credibility
James M. Kouzes
and Barry Z. Posner



RESEARCH FACT SHEET



Responses from the Force*

“What contributes to or detracts from the establishment of trust in your unit or organization?”

CONTRIBUTES TO TRUST:

Doing the Right Thing, Leading from the Front:

“Being the example.”

“Just doing the right thing.”

Transparency:

“Good communication develops and facilitates trust.”

“Trust is built when transparency exists and honest decision making is used.”

Display of Army Values:

“Living and following the Army Values.”

“Trust is built when Leaders take the ‘hard right.’”

DETRACTS FROM TRUST:\

Lack of Values:

“Leaders who do not live up to the Army Values.”

“Hypocrisy.”

“Toxic leadership.”

“Incompetence.”

“Do as I say, not as I do.”

Favoritism EO Issues:

“Incompetence and ‘good old boys’ system.”

“Office politics, vendettas, and power plays.”

No Accountability, Inconsistency:

“‘Passing the buck,’ only for it to be placed right back in the Soldier’s lap. No accountability at the Senior levels.”

“Constant change and constant re-setting of priorities detracts from trust.”

*Over 3,200 comments were provided in the survey in these categories. The quotations are illustrative responses.

Army Profession Trust

Trust is the confidence and belief in the “competence, character, and commitment” of an individual, group, unit or organization to accomplish the mission. Trust is the foundation for success in all Army activities. The Army Profession Survey II, sent to over 225,000 Army professionals in all components (including the Army Civilian Corps) in November 2011, sought respondents’ perspectives on the state of trust within the Army Profession. This section included the free response question: “What contributes to or detracts from the establishment of trust in your unit or organization?” Over 20,000 responded to the Survey, and this Fact Sheet provides a summary of the key findings.

Summary Findings

- Overall, 81% of the Army professionals surveyed expressed positive sentiments regarding the state of trust within the Army Profession.
- 97% of those surveyed confirmed that their professional loyalty is to the United States Constitution.
- 97% of Army professionals understand that doing what is right requires moral courage.
- Respondents (90%) agreed that the Army Values are consistent with their personal values.
- Army professionals believe there is a strong bond of trust between the Army and the Nation (96%).
- Over 90% agree that being a leader of character is the hallmark of an Army professional.
- A majority (60%) of respondents are positive about the state of trust within their units and organizations.
- Over 70% trust their unit and organizational leaders to make right decisions.
- When trust with unit leaders breaks down, there is a lack of consensus among Army professionals as to the principal cause (i.e., a lack of competence, character, or commitment).

Discussion Points

- What causes distrust? What can we do to address the problem?
- What can we do to develop trust in our units and organizations?
- Are there experiences you can share where specific decisions and actions fostered or diminished trust within your unit or organization?
- Discuss the comments in the column on the left.

Trust between Soldiers

Trust between Soldiers and Leaders

Trust between Soldiers, their Families and the Army

Trust between the Army and the American People

AMERICA'S ARMY – OUR PROFESSION

Trust

Notes:

- * The CSA approved the America's Army – Our Profession Education and Training program to inform and inspire the force on doctrine published in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army, Chapter 2 and in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, The Army Profession. These capstone documents define and describe the five essential characteristics of the Army Profession, membership and certification criteria of Army professionals, and the Army Ethic. This program is designed to enhance our understanding and commitment to our professional obligations.
- * Trust is the assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something. It is the essence of being an effective Soldier and Army Civilian. Trust is the core intangible needed by the Army inside and outside of the Profession. Our ability to fulfill our strategic roles and discharge our responsibilities to the Nation depends upon trust between Soldiers; between Soldiers and their leaders; among Soldiers, their Families, and the Army; and between the Army and the Nation. Ultimately, the Nation trusts the Army to provide landpower when, where, and how combatant commanders need it. (ADP 1, The Army, chapter 2).
- * Leaders are encouraged to include Trust as a topic in professional development sessions. They are encouraged to emphasize the importance of making transparent, values-based decisions, and maintaining candid communications with all who are affected. Promote a positive command climate where Soldiers and Army Civilians at all levels are empowered to use their initiative and learn from their mistakes. Emphasize the importance of Trust between Soldiers and Army Civilians. Increase awareness that in today's culture of instantaneous information one incident of misconduct can jeopardize Trust with the American people.

Foster continued commitment to the Army Profession, a noble and selfless calling founded on the bedrock of trust.

- CSA Marching Orders

Top-Line Messages:

- This is America's Army – Our Profession: meeting the needs of the Nation, built on values, standards and mutual trust.
- The Army Profession—where Military Expertise, Honorable Service, Esprit de Corps, and Stewardship are all built on a foundation of Trust—strengthens the force through periods of transition, reinforces our identity, and provides the critical foundation for the Army of 2020.
- The Army Profession sustains and strengthens the Nation's trust and confidence in America's Army.

Talking Points:

- Trust is the Bedrock of the Army Profession. Trust between Soldiers. Trust between Soldiers and Leaders. Trust between Soldiers, their Families, and the Army. Trust between Soldiers and Army Civilians. Trust between the Army and the American People.
- In order to maintain and sustain our bond of trust and confidence with the American people, the Army Profession demonstrates five essential characteristics: Trust, Military Expertise, Honorable Service, Esprit de Corps, and Stewardship of the Profession.
- Trust is essential for successful accomplishment of all our missions. In order to earn and develop trust within the Army Profession, we consistently demonstrate competence, character, and commitment; performing our duties effectively, ethically, with discipline and to standards.
- The American people have entrusted the Army to provide for their defense. As Army professionals, it is our duty to continue to serve them in an effective and ethical manner, preserving the trust we have earned, throughout our history and into the future.
- Trust among members of the Army Profession is genuine. All Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians take an

THE POWER OF A HAT

CPT JEREMY JACOBSON

Throughout history, the human head has been adorned with a variety of decorative, practical, and symbolic types of headgear. There is one type of headgear that encompasses all three headgear types, the Drill Sergeant hat. Although the hat is decorative and practical, the aspect of most significance is its symbolic nature. The Campaign or Australian Bush Hat is an outward representation of the Drill Sergeant as the authority figure on all things training. As discussed later, a select few may consider the hat as a source of exaggerated rank or unyielding power. Those people are incorrect!

The Drill Sergeant hat exists for the trainees to easily identify an expert source of information throughout the training in their pursuit to become Soldiers. The Drill Sergeant needs to identify the hat as a form of non-verbal communication stating, "I am here, I can train you."

The Campaign or Australian Bush Hat, once earned and placed upon the NCO, does not miraculously grant the individual special powers or favor. Samson, from the biblical story in Judges, derived his strength and power from his hair, and once his hair was cut he lost that power. The same cannot be said with a Drill Sergeant. A Drill Sergeant maintains the same authority to train prior to, during, and after his or her time on the trail; it is constant. All NCOs are held to the same standard, regardless of position. The power differential between a Drill Sergeant and trainee is too great and the mission too critical for that to be misconstrued.

The propensity to abuse power within the confines of such a wide power disparity requires continual monitoring both internally by the Drill Sergeant and externally by fellow Drill Sergeants and the command leadership. As best stated by John Dalberg-Acton, "Power tends to corrupt,

and absolute power corrupts absolutely." It can start with denigrating language and throwing mail and escalate to life altering situations and events for both Drill Sergeant and trainee if left unchecked.

Although this is a very small percentage of Drill Sergeants that become involved in such infractions, anyone is susceptible. The sweat and dirt collected on the numerous Campaign and Australian Bush Hats through the course of history executing the duties of a Drill Sergeant needs not to be tainted by the few outliers. More importantly, the American people have a special trust and confidence in our ability to transform the civilians we receive into Soldiers that will win on today's modern battlefield. We must not betray this trust through either simple or egregious acts of unprofessionalism.

Headgear cannot deceive within itself to cause acts unprofessionalism, the user is the source of corruption. Headgear is simply cotton, felt, leather, metal or some other material constructed in whatever fashion the consumer desires. A decorative piece of headgear can be emblazoned with design and color with little attention given to its pragmatic sense, such as the numerous derby hats on exhibit at Churchill Downs during race day. The practical headgear needs to serve its purpose but needs not be aesthetically pleasing, akin to the cowboy hats worn while settlers tamed the American West. The symbolic form of headgear typically represents an element of power or authority, such as the crown jewels used during the coronation of kings and queens. As mentioned previously, the Drill Sergeant hat encompasses all of these traits.

The Drill Sergeant hat is not the only atypical headgear worn within the U.S. Army. Distinctive headgear was originally encouraged as a source of morale enhancement. The maroon beret of

airborne units, the green beret of the Special Forces, and the now tan beret of the Ranger Regiment are a few headgear items distinct from other units. These units wear the different headgear as a means of invoking a sense of unit pride or esprit de corps. In contrast to the aforementioned groups, the Drill Sergeant hat is only worn by the Drill Sergeants within the unit. Does this fact provide the crux to the false sense of entitlement for a select few?

In addition to the U.S. Army, some significant figures from history are known for wearing symbolic headgear. Napoleon Bonaparte was a powerful and prominent military and political leader easily recognizable in his characteristic bicorn hat. Would Napoleon have been as effective of a leader if he had worn a typical French beret? Abraham Lincoln is generally referred to as one of the nation's finest presidents and leaders. He is ordinarily depicted wearing his signature stovepipe hat. Would President Lincoln have been able to save the Union sporting the more common top hat? Winston Churchill was one of the greatest wartime leaders of the 20th century and notorious for wearing the homburg hat. Would Churchill been as influential in achieving victory in World War II wearing a sombrero?

The answer to the questions above is of course, yes. The common thread among those leaders is that their authority and ability to lead did not arise from the item adorned on their head. Their headgear did not provide them authority nor did their headgear make them successful. They were successful on their own merit; their distinctive headgear was only a basis of recognition.

A similar argument could be made for the Drill Sergeant hat as solely a symbol of recognition. The hat is superfluous in regards to the Drill Sergeant executing their assigned duty. Once again, all NCOs are held to the same standard, regardless of position. A Drill Sergeant with a patrol cap and a Drill Sergeant badge should achieve the same results as a Drill Sergeant with the familiar headgear. All NCOs are trainers; however, the Campaign or Australian Bush Hat signifies this NCO is trained and proficient in his or her ability to transform civilians into Soldiers; it takes a special type of NCO to have the faculties to execute such duties.


All Drill Sergeants have the same goal of transforming civilians into Soldiers; however, not all Drill Sergeants carry equal responsibility toward this end state. The difference can easily be found Velcro-ed mid-chest on their uniform. A growing trend among Drill Sergeants is to homogenize the rank structure between Staff Sergeant and Sergeant First Class within the hat wearing community. The leveling of rank structure has allowed the term "battle" to creep into the lexicon of Drill Sergeants of varying rank when addressing one another. Although this may seem innocuous at first glance, this is a fundamental breakdown in good order and discipline within a unit.

The blurred lines between NCO ranks created by the term "battle" leaves a platoon without clear leadership roles. The senior Drill Sergeant, or platoon sergeant, is typically a Sergeant First Class and is just that, senior. The senior NCOs are placed in those positions because they have extensive experience in training Soldiers and dealing with enlisted Soldier issues. Not only do the leadership roles become uncertain for the "battle" NCOs, they are especially unclear and demonstrate a poor example to the transforming Soldiers. The trainees are attempting to learn and understand the rank structure but the use of "battle" confuses their efforts. We are setting them up for failure if we allow them to leave our training environment thinking a Staff Sergeant and Sergeant First Class are one in the same. So, if you want to be a "battle" to another Staff Sergeant, simply take off your Sergeant First Class rank and be a Staff Sergeant.

While the power and authority of a Drill Sergeant and NCO remains constant, there is one change while wearing the hat, more will be demanded of that NCO during his or her duty as a Drill Sergeant. They are carefully selected from the backbone of our Army to train this nation's future leaders, the Drill Sergeant is the standard-bearer, or gatekeeper, and ensures only highly trained Soldiers enter into our Army. The NCO wearing the Campaign or Australian Bush Hat is not now a Drill Sergeant first and an NCO second, the roles co-exist. NCOs and Drill Sergeants alike both train and take care of Soldiers.

CPT Jeremy Jacobson is the Commander of Echo Company, 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade

Breaking the Family Readiness Group Stereotype



I am a Soldier, a Drill Sergeant who is married to a civilian, who happens to be a male.

If you look at the statistics of females in the military within the Department of Defense in 2011, you will notice that even though the percent of Active Duty females is small (14.6%) the number is high (214,098). Here at Fort Jackson our population of Women training in Basic Combat Training units is the highest in the U. S. Army. In addition the Army is starting to see a rise of Woman in traditionally all male units. Even with all of the Women who have served throughout the U.S. Army's we still have a language in our culture that leaves the Woman Soldier out. We are not only leaving our Women Soldiers out, we are also leaving their families behind. The Army developed the Family Readiness Group (FRG) to provide information and support to our spouses. The FRG has always seemed to cater towards the traditional military wife and leave the other population of spouses behind. We will focus mainly on the military husband but the Army is also comprised of spouses of different ranks, different economic backgrounds, and different interest.

I am a Soldier, who also happens to be a Drill Sergeant, I am married, but my spouse is a HE. Shocking? Well it should not be. I decided to write this article because I am disappointed at the exclusionary language that I hear all too often. "Your wife", "Stay at home mom", or "she" everything. It is unfortunate but it often comes from male leaders when addressing large groups. When I hear these comments it makes me realize how the military is still very male dominate.

Women in the military date as early as the Revolutionary War. During this time, even though not allowed in uniform, we assisted men in various roles. There were even reports of women like Margaret Corbin who would take their husbands' spot on the cannon when they were wounded, or women like Deborah Sampson from Plympton, Massachusetts who fought in New York under the alias Robert Shurtliff in 1781. She served for over a year before she was discovered. In the American Civil War there were a few women who cross-dressed as men in order to fight. Fighting on the battlefield as men was not the only way women involved themselves in the military. Some women braved the battlefield as nurses and aides. Between now and then there would have had to be a few female Soldiers who were married to men who were not in the military.

Women were not allowed to become Drill Sergeants until February of 1972 when six Non-Commissioned Officers, who were a part of the Woman's Auxiliary Corps at Fort McClellan, AL, were enrolled in the Drill Sergeant program at Fort Jackson. Since then women have continued to serve alongside our male counterparts as Drill Sergeants in one of the most prestigious jobs in the United States Army. The expectations of a female Drill Sergeant are just as high as a male Drill Sergeant. We train Soldiers and execute battle drills. We instill the same discipline into those Soldiers as our male counterparts do. We uphold the same standards and abide by the same regulations so why are we, or our spouses, not treated with the same respect and dignity both in actions and in words.

Recently there has been talk of allowing women in some combat arms Military Occupational Specialties which will allow for even more diversity. In 2013 the United States Armed Forces overturned a 1994 ruling banning women from serving in combat Military Occupational Specialties, potentially clearing the way for women to have more of a direct role in front-line units and elite commando teams. Some will read this and see it as a small thing but in reality it is much bigger than just verbiage. It is about principal and it is about mindset. The Army constantly experiences growth and change, as leaders we must learn to adapt. We must be able to accept the fact that our leaders will not and are not always a “He” and our spouses will not always be a “She”. We have to be careful of what we say and how we say it, because we never know who we might offend or exclude.



I remember asking my husband if he wanted to be a part of the FRG, although he did not mind getting involved; however, he was hesitant because he felt it was geared towards women and I had to agree with him. Not only is he in that mindset about volunteering for the Family Readiness Group events, most of the time the Chain of Command will lean directly toward the male Soldier/Non-Commissioned Officer. Now let me be clear, I am not saying using this type of exclusionary language is done purposely or with malice intent, actually most of the time the message being relayed is very positive and intended to be motivational. The Family Readiness Group seems to be geared towards only the male Soldiers in the audience and this has become a little discouraging. As a female in the United States Army, some of my peers and I are the “bread winner in the family and our husbands have taken the role as the “stay at home dad”. I want to shed light on this situation because it has been a conversation that other female Soldiers and I have talked about on many occasions. This has allowed the female Soldier, the female

Non-Commissioned Officer to advance her career and compete with her male counterparts.

I am a Soldier, a Commander who is married to a civilian, who happens to be a male.

I am a Company Commander, a Soldier, a wife, and a mother. Everything stated above I have also experienced as a Commissioned Officer. From a senior leader perspective it is even more evident. Male leaders are expected to have a wife upfront and be active in the unit. As a female leader my husband is expected to be more in the back ground. This is really evident with the FRG. A Commander's spouse is expected to run the FRG, unless you have a husband. If you are female you are expected to find a Soldier with a wife who is active in the unit to run the FRG. These are all unwritten rules. I have tried to get my husband to lead the FRG to change the stereotype but based on his experience with the FRG he wants little to nothing to do with it.

While deployed my husband initially tried to participate in the unit FRG but did not stay active in it due to the events they planned. There were regular shopping trips, tea parties, and gossip sessions with no thought of trying to incorporate anything tailored to both male and female participants. These events also had the tendency to also leave out the spouses of lower enlisted, full-time working spouses, and the non-“girly girl” wives. Military spouses all have to endure the same stresses and struggles as the “traditional” military wives that the FRG is designed to reduce. Claire Gordon wrote “Hidden Struggles of Military Spouses” in 2012. She mentioned the obvious stressors such as extended separation, keeping up a home by yourself, and the uncertainty of your spouse's status when deployed. Her article was focused on the military spouse's career. Even in her article she focused on wives and did not use any language to indicate the possibility of husbands as military spouses. My husband has yet to find a career that pays enough to cover the cost of daycare and is willing to hire him knowing the longest he will be with the company is around three years as Claire Gordon discusses. He is currently working to finish his degree to make himself more competitive in today's job market. While being a fulltime college student, he also is the primary care giver to our two year-old daughter. Being a husband and not a wife, he does not have the additional support from the other spouses in the unit, or military. Think of how awkward it would be for him on a play date with all “Army wives.” To top everything off he has to be flexible with his time. I do not

have a set schedule which leads to very long days. Training also requires me to stay in the field for an extended amount of time making him a single dad at times. Where is his support system? We are from the Midwest and stationed at Fort Jackson, SC. We do not have any family close by and he had to leave all of his acquaintances when he married me and joined team Army. Every few years we have to move again and any stability he may have developed is pulled out from under him and he has to start over. My husband is not the only one who experiences this. Think of the young Soldiers we train at Fort Jackson, some of which are married and have families. Even if not young they are new to the Army. When they arrive to their first duty station what support will the FRG provide them?



Being a mother in the military has its own challenges. My primary focus is always supposed to be “mission first”; however when my daughter is sick or going through something, sometimes only mommy will do. My husband is expected to be able to care for her at a drop of a hat since I usually cannot leave work or take time off to care for her. When I do have to bring her to the office it is looked down upon even though my male counter parts are praised for being dads. I believe if we had the same support system military wives had my husband would have help taking care of my daughter and I would not have to worry what he is sacrificing while I am stuck at work and he is struggling with being a stay at home dad.

As leaders we first need to change the language throughout our units in order to make our Woman

Soldiers as much of the team as our male Soldiers. Our Woman Soldiers are increasingly doing the same jobs as their male counterparts. They have and continue to serve in many different ways on the front lines. Both Men and Woman have witnessed firsthand the horrors of wars past and present and have shared the burden and the glory of serving our great nation.

We must encourage and back-up our non-traditional FRG leaders. If our spouses of Woman Soldiers, of our lower enlisted, of any Soldier has an idea to reach out to the families we need to at least entertain the idea. Reaching out to families takes time and effort. If you think you will get the best response by email alone you are wrong. Leaders need to use multiple media sources when reaching out to families. Most due prefer email while others prefer telephonic or even in person. Other ways to reach out is by planning events that spark varied interest and include everyone (even the single Solider). This evolution, as with any, cannot happen overnight but with the push of leaders and over time it will happen.

Woman Soldiers represent at least 14% of the total Army and well over a quarter of the training population here at Fort Jackson. The United States Army could not have thrived in the past without us and also not evolve without completely integrating us. We need to change the language of our culture to reflect Women being an integral part of our military and the United States Army. As with any Soldier, their family also serves in a different way and faces certain challenges that Army life brings. We need to reach out to all of our families to include our husbands.

I am a Soldier, I am married but my she is a HE.

CPT Pamela DeVille is the Commander of Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade. SFC Natonya Osborne and SSG LaTwanya Robinson are Drill Sergeants in Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade

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 2 National Women’s History Museum “Deborah Sampson (1760-1827). Retrieved September 26, 2013 from <http://www.nwhm.org/education-resources/biography/biographies/deborah-sampson/>
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 6 The Women’s Memorial (November 30, 2011) “Statistics on Women in the Military”. Retrieved on October 03, 2013 from <http://www.womensmemorial.org/PDFs/StatsonWIM.pdf>



**In the long run, you hit only
what you aim at.**

Henry David Thoreau

exception of the pull-up or straight arm-pull that is conducted in moderate cadence. The duration of the exercise on each station is 60 seconds. There is a maximum of three rotations for this circuit. See FM 7-22 Figure 9-34 page 9-55 for more details.

You may ask yourself, how can I acquire kettlebells when it's not a part of my unit's Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) or can I purchase them through my unit Supply channels? Unfortunately, kettlebells cannot be purchased using the Government Purchase Card (GPC). However, they can be purchased through the Army Property Book Unit Supply Enhance (PBUSE) system;

National Stock Number (NSN): 7830016157844 under Recreational and Athletic Equipment. One other option is to have your unit's Battalion Supply personnel coordinate with any of the gyms that are located on Fort Jackson's installation to request to sign for kettlebells.

Thoughts on Injury Prevention with STC implementation:

Resistance training, when performed properly, plays a significant role in injury prevention, and the STC is no different. There are several considerations, however, to keep in mind to ensure that the performance of the STC does not lead to injury.

First, it is important to have the proper amount and types of equipment to perform the STC at a platoon level. This will help ensure that exercises are performed properly. Additionally, precision in instruction is paramount. Proper instruction during the toughening phase will ensure that soldiers in IET will have a solid foundation to perform the STC. It is also important to remember that while Table 9-10 in Chapter 9 of FM 7-22 has suggested resistance levels for exercises, individual

soldiers in IET may not be able to properly perform the exercise with the prescribed weight. Focus should be placed on performing the exercise correctly over using the suggested resistance for the suggested repetitions. Technique should not suffer to reach the last repetition.

- *Increase in muscle size.*
- *Improve neurological function, more effective muscle contraction and better response to realistic situations.*
- *Motor patterns get developed (muscle memory) by practicing strength training drills; movements that require strength are enhanced.*
- *Resistance training also has a positive effect on bone, muscle and associated connective tissue; the entire musculoskeletal system adapts to specific exercise (benefits WTBD performance).*

Benefits of Strength Training

Ultimately, the PRT system described in FM 7-22 is the doctrine of Army physical readiness, what we want to accomplish is readiness through well trained Soldiers that have learned the fundamentals first and are able to transition toward more advanced and demanding activities.

Leaders have to be aware of the large variation between IET Soldiers with respect to gender, age, nutritional needs and prior fitness levels before starting any type of training. Leaders must be equipped with knowledge, coaching and mentorship skills to build Soldiers from the inside out. NCOs must be the role model and know the doctrine. The STC, when properly implemented, offers a change of pace during the toughening phase of IET. However, to achieve the best results in performance improvement and injury prevention, one must remember individual Soldiers' strength levels, and the importance of maintaining proper technique.

SFC Samuel Gomez is a former Drill Sergeant in Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade. Mr. George Harkness is a former Battalion Athletic Trainer.

Jackson Journal

Articles Needed

The Jackson Journal is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include any aspect of training or leading Soldiers in Initial Military Training (IMT). If you are unsure whether a topic is suitable, please contact us.

Feature articles are usually between 2,000 and 4,000 words (but those are not rigid guidelines). We prefer clear, correct, concise, and consistent wording expressed in the active voice. Also, please spell out all acronyms and abbreviations the first time you use them.

Photographs or graphics that support your article are encouraged when you submit your article, please include the original electronic file of all graphs (jpeg, power point, etc).

Submit articles NLT 3 March 2014 for the April - July 2014 issue by email to: michael.ryan9@us.army.mil or john.d.philibert.civ@mail.mil


“A good company idea in tactics is likely to remain confined to one company indefinitely, even though it would be of benefit to the whole military establishment”.

S.L.A. Marshall

Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command, 1947

Add to your

Reading List



An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942–1943, Volume One of the Liberation Trilogy



Rick Atkinson. // Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC 2002

In this first volume of Rick Atkinson's highly anticipated Liberation Trilogy, he shows why no modern reader can understand the ultimate victory of the Allied powers in May 1945 without a solid understanding of the events that took place in North Africa during 1942 and 1943. Atkinson convincingly demonstrates that the first year of the Allied war effort was a pivotal point in American history, the moment when the United States began to act like a great military power.

The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us And What We Can Do About It

Joshua Cooper Ramo / Little Brown & Co 2010

The traditional physics of power has been replaced by something radically different. In *The Age of the Unthinkable*, Joshua Cooper Ramo puts forth a revelatory new model for understanding our dangerously unpredictable world. Drawing upon history, economics, complexity theory, psychology, immunology, and the science of networks, he describes a new landscape of inherent unpredictability--and remarkable, wonderful possibility.



Search Inside Yourself: The Unexpected Path to Achieving Success, Happiness (and World Peace)

Chade-Meng Tan / HarperCollins 2012

With *Search Inside Yourself*, Chade-Meng Tan, one of Google's earliest engineers and personal growth pioneer, offers a proven method for enhancing mindfulness and emotional intelligence in life and work. Meng's job is to teach Google's best and brightest how to apply mindfulness techniques in the office and beyond; now, readers everywhere can get insider access to one of the most sought after classes in the country, a course in health, happiness and creativity that is improving the livelihood and productivity of those responsible for one of the most successful businesses in the world.

In 1921, an unknown World War I American soldier was buried in Arlington National Cemetery. This site, on a hillside overlooking the Potomac River and the city of Washington, D.C., became the focal point of reverence for America's veterans.

Similar ceremonies occurred earlier in England and France, where an unknown soldier was buried in each nation's highest place of honor (in England, Westminster Abbey; in France, the Arc de Triomphe). These memorial gestures all took place on November 11, giving universal recognition to the celebrated ending of World War I fighting at 11 a.m., November 11, 1918 (the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month). The day became known as "Armistice Day."

The first celebration using the term Veterans Day occurred in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1947. Raymond Weeks, a World War II veteran, organized "National Veterans Day," which included a parade and other festivities, to honor all veterans. The event was held on November 11, then designated Armistice Day. Later, U.S. Representative Edward Rees of Kansas proposed a bill that would change Armistice Day to Veterans Day. In 1954, Congress passed the bill that President Eisenhower signed proclaiming November 11 as Veterans Day.

The focal point for official, national ceremonies for Veterans Day continues to be the memorial amphitheater built around the Tomb of the Unknowns. At 11 a.m. on November 11, a combined color guard representing all military services executes "Present Arms" at the tomb. The nation's tribute to its war dead is symbolized by the laying of a presidential wreath. The bugler plays "taps." The rest of the ceremony takes place in the amphitheater.

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs



President Barack Obama places a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier during a Veteran's Day ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, November 11, 2013.

AFP PHOTO / Jim WATSON /Getty Images